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Abstract 
International oil and gas companies are experiencing an increase in terrorist attacks. 
After the oil and gas industry became a legitimate target for terrorist groups in the 1990s 
the number of attacks have increased yearly, with a spike after the 9/11 attacks. In 
today’s interconnected world political risk is not only about the relationship between the 
host government and the company. Oil and gas companies may experience risks on a 
transnational, national and human security level. Because of this, the success of new 
investments often depends on the successful utilization of risk management strategies. 
This research study focuses on the importance of political-security risk in the oil and gas 
industry. This is a risk-management tool to be used before and during international 
operations; it enables companies to be better prepared to deal with risks that may arise. 
In January 2013 the oil and gas industry experienced one of its deadliest attacks. The In 
Amenas gas facility in Algeria was attack by terrorists and in a four-day siege 40 people 
lost their lives. This forced the oil and gas industry to reconsider its focus on security 
management. As one of the contractors at the facility, Statoil undertook a thorough 
analysis of security at the site as well as of the company´s corporate security risk 
management. The report revealed a lack of focus on political-security risk. Accordingly, 
the main research question in this study concerns the effect of terrorism on political-
security risk in the oil and gas industry; it specifically analyzes the In Amenas attack. 
The aim of this study is to answer this question along with two sub-questions, which 
complement and support the main research question. The first sub-question concerns 
the factors that contributed to the attack in In Amenas: why was risk mitigation not 
successful? The second sub-question looks at the possibilities for international oil and 
gas companies to mitigate the risk of terrorism; or is this a risk that can only be 
managed? This study argues that political-security risk has not been used to its full 
potential in the oil and gas industry. The oil and gas industry has always focused on site 
security, but a broader more holistic approach to risk management has been lacking. 
However, as a result of the In Amenas incident, the industry has become more willing to 
have a new discussion on security and this has resulted in small changes in the way 
companies operate.  
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Opsomming  
Internasionale olie- en gasmaatskappye ondervind ‘n toename in terreur aanvalle. Nadat 
die olie en gasindustrie ‘n wettige teiken vir tereurgroepe in die 1990s geword het, het 
die aantal aanvalle per jaar toegeneem, met ‘n skerp styging na die 9/11 aanvalle. In 
vandag se onderling verbonde wêreld hou die politiese risiko nie net verband met die 
verhouding tussen die gasregering en die maatskappy nie. Olie- en gasmaatskappye 
mag risiko’s op trans-nasionale, nasionale en menslike sekuriteitsvlak ervaar. As gevolg 
hiervan maak die sukses van nuwe beleggings dikwels staat op die suksesvolle gebruik 
van risiko-bestuur strategieë. Hierdie navorsingstudie fokus op die belang van ‘n 
politiese veiligheidsrisiko in die olie en gasindustrie. Hierdie is ‘n risiko-bestuur 
gereedskap wat gebruik sal word voor en tydens internasionale operasies; dit stel die 
maatskappye in staat om beter voorbereid te wees om die risiko’s wat mag voorkom te 
hanteer. In Januarie 2013 het die olie en gasindustrie een van die dodelikste aanvalle 
beleef. Die In Amenas olie-aanleg in Algerië is deur terroriste aangeval en tydens ‘n 4 
dae lange inval het 40 mense hul lewens verloor. Dit het die olie en gasindustrie 
gedwing om hul fokus op veiligheidsbestuur te heroorweeg. As een van die kontrakteur 
by die aanleg het Statoil ‘n deeglike ontleding van die sekuriteit by die plek sowel as die 
maatskappy se korporatiewe veiligheid risikobestuur onderneem. Die verslag het ‘n 
gebrek aan fokus op die politiese veiligheidsrisiko getoon. Die hoof navorsingsvraag in 
hierdie studie het betrekking op die effek van terreur op politiese veiligheidsrisiko in die 
olie- en gasindustrie; dit ontleed spesifiek die In Amenas aanval. Die doel van hierdie 
studie is om hierdie vraag tesame met twee sub-vrae wat die hoof navorsingsvraag 
komplimenteer en ondersteun.  Die eerste sub-vraag het betrekking op die faktore wat 
bygedra het tot die aanval in In Amenas: hoekom was risiko mitigasie onsuksesvol? Die 
tweede sub-vraag kyk na die moontlikhede vir internasionale olie- en gasmaatskappye 
om die risiko van terreur te versag; of is hierdie ‘n risiko wat slegs bestuur kan word? 
Hierdie studie argumeneer dat politiese veiligheidsrisiko nie tot sy volle potensiaal in die 
olie en gasindustrie gebruik is nie. Die olie en gasindustrie het altyd gefokus op die 
veiligheid van die plek, maar ‘n breër holistiese benadering tot risiko-bestuur het 
ontbreek. As gevolg van die In Amenas insident, het die industrie meer gewillig geword 
om ‘n nuwe bespreking oor veiligheid te hê en dit het klein veranderinge in die manier 
waarop maatskappye opereer tot gevolg gehad.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction  
In today’s increasingly globalized world investors in the oil and gas sector have to take 
into account a number of risks when deciding to invest in a country or to expand already 
existing investments. Political risk is always a factor that has to be considered in 
decision-making processes in these companies. The success of an investment often 
depends on proper risk management and risk mitigation. In the oil and gas industry it is 
not uncommon that investments can exceed billions of dollars and take several years to 
complete. Because of this, political risk management and mitigation is of the greatest 
importance.  Petroleum and mining investments are often, as pointed out by Moran 
(1998:70), the “most sensitive of all international corporate activities”. According to 
Moran (1998:70), these natural resources are often seen as the country´s national 
patrimony and investments in these sectors can often affect the country in substantial 
ways, compared to other investments. It can lead to increased international prestige and 
power and contribute to increased prosperity in a country.  
 
The history of foreign investments in petroleum dates back to the start of the century. It 
began with British and German companies that were interested in getting access to the 
large oil reserves in the Middle East. A world–wide scramble to win concessions 
occurred, especially in the interwar period when many petroleum concessions were 
granted and all the oil-rich areas of the world were divided between the big oil 
companies (Lax, 1983:21). The major oil and gas reserves are located in regions that 
have been characterized as politically unstable. Sixty-five per cent of the reserves are 
located in the Middle East (Berlin, Berlin & Vrooman, 2003). Due to this the oil and gas 
industry is always vulnerable; a number of risks may affect it, such as corruption, 
taxation systems, governmental regulations, civil and labour unrest, political instability, 
environmental activism, repatriation restrictions, war, external threats and terrorism. 
However oil and gas firms are willing to be exposed to some degree of risk as long as 
they are able to manage the risk and secure a profit (Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell & 
Steen, 2006:632). However, sometimes their attempts at risk management fail.  
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One example is the In Amenas incident. In the early morning of 16 January 2013, an 
Algerian terrorist group named Katibat al-Mulathameen ('The Masked Brigade'), also 
known as al-Muwaqqi‘ūn bi-d-Dimā ('Those who Sign with Blood') attacked the 
Statoil/British Petroleum (BP)-operated gas facility located in In Amenas, on the border 
between Algeria and Libya, and killed 40 workers (Chrisafis, Borger, McCurry & 
Macalister, 2013). Attacks on energy infrastructure happen quite often and have been 
occurring for a long time1. The vulnerability of oil and gas facilities has recently received 
increased attention from world leaders. In a world with a constant demand for more oil 
and gas, the gap between supply and demand is getting smaller. Because of this tight 
margin a small incident may cause disruption in the supply chain, leading to increased 
global political and economic tension. Terrorists have taken advantage of this situation 
and, according to Steinhäuser, Furthner, Heidegger, Rydell and Zaitseva (2008), attacks 
on oil and gas installations have become the weapon of choice for terrorists all over the 
world. 
 
Al Qaeda, one of the most famous  terrorist organizations, has as its main goal to 
destroy the United States (US) and the Western economy. They have publicly stated 
that a means to reach this goal will be attacks against the oil and gas industry 
(Johnston, 2008). The attack on In Amenas can be seen as part of  this larger picture. 
The Masked Brigade that was responsible for the In Amenas attack is an Al Qaeda-
affiliated group. The leader of the group, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, was one of the leading 
figures in the group Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but because of infighting, 
Belmokhtar was stripped of his title. He left AQIM with his soldiers and founded The 
Masked Brigade in late 2012; this group now answers to Al Qaeda´s senior leadership 
(Joscelyn & Roggio, 2013). Because this is such a recent event, there is not much 
information about the group and its operations. However, it is clear that it has definitely 
increased the political risk for companies operating in the oil and gas industry in the 
region.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Ogaden	  Basin	  where	  Ogaden	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  (ONLF)	  on	  27	  April	  2007	  attacked	  a	  Chinese-­‐run	  oilfield.	  74	  workers	  were	  killed	  and	  the	  facility	  destroyed.	  ONLF	  is	  fighting	  to	  make	   the	   Ogaden	   region	   in	   eastern	   Ethiopia	   an	   independent	   state;	   in	   a	   statement	   after	   the	   attack	   they	  warned	   international	   oil	   companies	   not	   to	   enter	   into	   business	   deals	   in	   the	   region	   (Abullahi,	   2007).	   Other	  examples	   are	   the	   numerous	   attacks	   on	   oil	   installations	   in	   the	   Niger	   Delta	   since	   the	   early	   90s,	   caused	   by	  tension	  between	  local	  minority	  groups	  and	  international	  oil	  companies	  (Connors,	  2008).	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1.2 Preliminary Review  
In this study four broad fields of literature will be examined. The first is literature 
regarding political-risk analysis and political-security risk. This will provide the theoretical 
foundation of this study. Theories that are related to political risk, including rational 
choice, problem-solving and decision-making theories will be examined.  The main texts 
that will be used to highlight political risk come from a number of highly influential 
scholars and include a number of works by Simon (1982, 1987) and Kobrin (1984, 
1979). Work published by Robock (1971), Fitzpatrick (1983), Brink (2004), Alon and 
Martin (1998), Brewer (1981) and Jakobsen (2012) will also be used to extend the 
theoretical grounding. Political-security risk is a sub-category of political risk, and is 
relatively new; because of this there is a lack of literature on the topic. However, from 
the literature that does exist the following sources will be used: Pringle and Lambrechts 
(2011), The Risk of Humanitarianism: Towards an Inclusive Model, and Fouchè (2003), 
A Political Security Risk Analysis of Uganda. Lambrechts, Weldon and Boshoff (2010), 
Political Insecurity and the Extraction Industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Moving towards an Industry Specific Political-security Risk Analysis Model, will also be 
used to gain a deeper insight into political-security risk. The challenges and possibilities 
regarding risk management and mitigation will be covered, using mainly work done by 
Lax (1983) and Brink (2004), who both write extensively on the topic.   
 
 The second field is industry-specific risk in the oil and gas industry. The different 
sources used in this section will establish the connection between political risk and the 
oil and gas industry. Berlin, Berlin and Vrooman´s  (2003) article, Managing Political 
Risk in the Oil and Gas industry, will be thoroughly studied along with works by several 
other scholars, including Frynas and Mellahi (2003), Alon et al. (2006), and Lax (1983), 
who have all contributed to an expanded knowledge about industry-specific risk.  
 
Thirdly, literature on terrorism will be consulted, with a special emphasis on terrorism 
aimed at the oil and gas industry. In this section the focus will be on terrorism in Algeria 
and northern Africa. This will contextualize the relationship between terrorism in Algeria 
and Statoil´s activities in the country. Country reports on terrorism, published by the US 
State Department will also be examined.  The main scholars consulted in this section 
will be Whittaker (2007), The Terrorism Reader, and Crenshaw (2011), Explaining 
Terrorism. Both works give an introduction to the complexity of the term ‘terrorism’ and 
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will be used to clarify the term in this research study. Johnston (2008), Oil and terrorism: 
Al Qaeda Threat, will be used to look at the terrorist threat to the oil and gas industry 
and to examine the kind of impact this has on the industry.  Cilliers (2010), Terrorism 
and Africa, will provide a broader view of terrorism on the continent while Martinez 
(2006), Why the Violence in Algeria; Botha (2008), Terrorism in the Maghreb: The 
Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, and Steinberg and Werenfels (2007), 
Between the `Near` and the `Far` Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, will give a 
closer view of terrorism in Algeria and the neighbouring countries.   
 
The fourth and final part will look at Statoil’s involvement in the Algerian oil and gas 
industry. Literature covering Statoil’s history and investments in Algeria will be 
examined. In this section a report, compiled by an investigation team commissioned by 
the Statoil board of directors and presented to the public on 16 January 2013, after the 
In Amenas attack, will be consulted along with information retrieved from Statoil´s own 
webpage. Chrisafis, Borger, McCurry & Macalister (2013) will also be used to gain a 
clearer picture of what happened on the day of the attack. The In Amenas facilities were 
jointly operated by the Norwegian company Statoil, by BP and the by the Algerian 
national company, Sonatrach. In this research study the focus will be on Statoil, which 
does not have the same experience as BP with terrorism, the study will examine how 
Statoil´s risk mitigation and management have been affected by the incident.    
 
1.3 Research Problem 
In a constantly expanding global world with increased levels of foreign investment, 
political risk analysis becomes more and more important. The high values associated 
with oil and gas lead international companies to invest in countries with increased 
political-security risks. Africa´s political instability has been seen as one of the main 
reasons why foreign investors are unwilling to invest in the continent (Frynas, 1998). 
The African continent is seen as unstable because of the number of wars, the frequent 
coups d'état, and the occurrence of religious and ethnic conflicts (Dupasquier & 
Osakwe, 2006:250).  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), in their paper, FDI to Africa: the role of 
price stability and currency instability, found that wars were more likely to occur on the 
African continent than in any other parts of the world. However, many international 
companies continue to invest in the continent. As stated previously, most oil and gas 
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reserves can be found in areas labelled as troubled areas. To survive in today’s harsh 
business environment, oil and gas companies have to accept high levels of risk. This is 
reflected in the number of terrorist attacks aimed at oil and gas companies that have 
occurred this century.  
 
According to Lia and Kjøk (2004), attacks on refineries have happened quite infrequently 
since 1968. This finding is based on the ´The International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events` (ITERATE) database, covering the period from 1922 until 1999. 
However data collection prior to 1968 is not systematic. Between 1968 and 1999 there 
were only twelve recorded attacks on refineries and only two of these happened in the 
1990s (Lia & Kjøk, 2004: 109). Of the 5,000 incidents recorded between 1922 and 1999, 
only 262 attacks targeted oil and gas facilities. However, after the September 11 terrorist 
attack, the focus of terror organizations shifted to oil and gas facilities (Yetiv, 2011:193). 
In 2004 Al Qaeda published a document entitled “The Laws of targeting Petroleum-
Related Interests and a Review of the Laws Pertaining to the Economic Jihad” (cited in. 
Pippard, 2010), and it became a noticible increasse in attacks aimed at the oil and gas 
industry worldwide. These include pipeline attacks in Colombia, Russia, India, Mexico 
and Iraq. In Iraq alone there have been over 374 attacks on pipelines in the period 
between 2003 and 2006. Terrorists have targeted development and exploration sites in 
the Niger Delta. In 2002 the French supertanker Limburg was rammed by a small boat 
loaded with explosives outside Yemen, and in 2006 there was an attempted terrorist 
attack on the world´s largest oil refinery, Abqaiq, in Saudi Arabia: a group of terrorists 
tried to ram two explosive-laden vehicles into the refinery. They were able to penetrate 
the first line of security, but were stopped before getting through the second defensive 
ring (Steinhaüsler et al. 2008). 
  
This new and increasing level of political-security risk, with specific reference to 
terrorism, is inflicting economical loses on companies and more importantly threatening 
the lives of employees in the sector. The increase in terrorist attacks against the oil and 
gas industry has changed ways of thinking about risk in the oil and gas industry. We 
have gone from a period with few incidents to a period with an increased number attacks 
on oil and gas facilities (the extreme example being the attack on In Amenas); one may 
ask how this affects the industry and whether it is equipped to deal with this new reality. 
Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis will be: 
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 -­‐ What is the impact of terrorism on political-security risk management and 
mitigation in the oil and gas industry?  
 
Two sub-questions have been developed to supplement and support the main research 
question:  -­‐ What factors contributed to the attack in In Amenas, and why was risk mitigation 
not successful? -­‐ Is it possible for international oil and gas companies to mitigate the risk of 
terrorism, or can this risk only be managed? 
 
1.4 Objective and Relevance of the Study 
As been pointed out earlier, terrorist attacks against the oil and gas industry have 
become more frequent since Al Qaeda publicly announced that the oil and gas industry 
was an attractive target and a way of crippling Western economies. There are many 
international oil and gas companies, but the number of discoveries of major new oil and 
gas fields has decreased. As a consequence, the companies have to be willing to 
accept higher levels of risk to be able to continue to make profits. Little research has 
been undertaken aimed at exploring how risk mitigation and management have been 
affected by this upswing in the number of terrorist attacks.  The main purpose of this 
research is to discover how, or to the extent to which, the oil and gas industries and their 
risk management and mitigation strategies are being affected by terrorist attacks. 
 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of terrorism on political-security risk, 
and to assess political-security risk mitigation and management. The methodology of the 
study will be predominantly qualitative and the research design will be a single case 
study. Most case studies that are carried out are qualitative, but this does not have to be 
the case. Non-case-study research is usually quantitative. Case-study research and 
qualitative research are not necessarily the same, but as Neuman says, “almost all 
qualitative research seeks to construct representation based on in-depth detailed 
knowledge of cases” (2011:42). Qualitative studies generate a vast amount of data 
focused on specific cases and because of this the findings cannot be generalized to 
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other cases. A number of scholars argue that case studies can be used for forming 
hypotheses, which again have to be tested through other forms of research design. This 
may eventually lead to  wider generalizations (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 
2008:64).  In the case of this research study, a case study focusing on the attack on In 
Amenas will be applied to provide deeper knowledge regarding risk mitigation and 
management in the oil and gas industry. Since the focus will be on one incident, it will 
not be possible to generalize to the oil and gas industry in general, but this study will 
provide a building block that can be used in further research on the topic. Predominantly 
secondary sources are used in this research for practical reasons; these have mainly to 
do with the limitations of doing research on political-security risk due to the fact that risk 
analysis bureaus keep their models a secret. Thus the study will be based on relevant 
data acquired from academic books, journals, and reports available at the Stellenbosch 
University library or found online. 
 
 In this thesis the In Amenas attack in 2013 will be used as a case study.  This was one 
of the most severe attacks conducted against a gas installation and it produced the most 
serious international crisis Statoil has ever faced. Since the In Amenas episode was the 
most severe attack Statoil has ever experienced, it will be be interesting to examine 
Statoil´s risk mitigation and management strategies with regard to terrorism and to see 
to what extent the attack has affected these. The use of a case study will enable us to 
link abstract ideas with the concrete specifics in this particular case. The study will be 
descriptive in nature. According to Neuman, descriptive research starts with a defined 
question and tries to answer this question as accurately as possible. The outcome of the 
study provides a detailed answer to the research question (Neuman, 2011:38-39). This 
research study is descriptive in the sense that it tries to explain the situation by looking 
at recent terrorist attacks against the oil and gas industry. Descriptive studies often aim 
to answer the ‘how’ and ’who’ questions. The essential question to answer is how 
terrorism affects the oil and gas industry. Descriptive and exploratory research can often 
be hard to separate; more often than not they merge together. The research is 
exploratory in the sense that it aims to provide new insights into the topic. The focus is 
on a relatively new case study regarding political risk in the oil and gas industry. Lastly 
the research will be explanatory since the aim is to explain why political-security risk 
mitigation and management is important in the oil and gas industry. The purpose of 
explanatory research is to give an answer to the ´why´ question. Why are things the way 
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they are? It builds on descriptive research and tries to explain why something occurs 
(Neuman, 2011:40). The research will be on a micro-level since the focus in this thesis 
is solely on the oil and gas industry,  with Statoil as the main focus.  
 
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations 
In this research study the focus will be on the political-risk element of political-security 
risk. One limitation is that the field of political-security risk has just started to attract 
interest, thus not much literature is available on this topic. There are very few oil and gas 
companies that have a specific focus on political-security risk. However, by examining 
the practices of these companies one is able to gain a good understanding of the extent 
to which oil and gas companies are using political-security risk in their analyses. 
 
Another limitation is that this study will not have access to already-existing models used 
by risk units at the different oil and gas companies, or to the risk models developed by 
established risk firms, since these are seen as the property of the companies 
concerned. This limits our ability to see how and to what extent oil and gas companies 
are using political-security risk as a management tool. However, by using other sources, 
such as annual reports, surveys and journal articles on the topic, it is possible to get a 
good idea of how the oil and gas companies are handling political-security risk. The 
limited access to primary data on the topic combined with a lack of financial resources 
makes it difficult to conduct field studies. This problem will be resolved by using up-to-
date information available online and referring to journals on the topic of terrorism in the 
oil and gas industry and political-security risk.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Research Study  
In Chapter Two secondary data will be used to provide a deeper understanding of the 
theoretical grounding of this research study. Political risk theory is based in problem-
solving and decision-making theory and it is natural to start off by conceptualizing these 
theories. This will be followed up by an account of risk, political risk, and macro- and 
micro-risk. This section will also look more closely at industry-specific or firm-specific 
risk and will thoroughly examine political-security risk. A conceptualization of risk 
management and mitigation will also be presented in Chapter Two. The chapter will end 
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of with a conceptualization of ‘terrorism’, along with an overview of how terrorism has 
evolved since the term was first put into use.  
 
 In Chapter Three secondary data will be used to contextualize the research study. This 
chapter will contain an account of the development of terrorist groups in northern Africa 
and Algeria. A special focus will be the evolution of the most influential terrorist 
organizations in Algeria at the time of writing. This will be followed up by a close look at 
the oil and gas industry and how it is affected by terrorism. In particular, the chapter will 
look more closely at the history of Statoil and its international operations. The 
company´s investments in Algeria and the In Amenas attack will be scrutinized in detail. 
Chapters Two and Three will build the foundation of the research by providing sections 
based on theory and on empirical findings.  
 
Chapter Four provides a critical analysis of the data put forward in the two previous 
chapters, based on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two. Political-
security risk management and mitigation in the oil and gas sector will be scrutinized, 
with an emphasis on Statoil’s ability to effectively use political-security risk management 
and mitigation. The possibilities for oil and gas companies to effectively mitigate the risk 
of terrorism will also be examined.  
 
 Chapter Five will conclude the research study based on the research done in Chapters 
Two, Three and Four in the light of the research question. The results of the analysis in 
Chapter Four will be critically evaluated and possible improvements will be commented 
on. The research study will conclude with suggestions for further research in the field of 
political-security risk in the oil and gas industry.  
 
1.7 Conclusion  
2In this chapter a general introduction to the research problem has been given, along 
with an outline of the objectives and relevance of the study; the research design and 
methodology has been explained, and, finally, an outline of the remaining chapters has 
been provided. The research problem in this study requires an analysis of the impact 
terrorism has on political-security risk management and mitigation in the oil and gas 
industry. The attack on Statoil´s facilities in In Amenas in 2013 will be used as a case 
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study. Two sub-questions have been developed to supplement and support the main 
question. The sub-questions focus more narrowly on the In Amenas attack and on 
Statoil´s risk mitigation prior to the attack. It also looks at the possibilities for oil and gas 
companies to mitigate the risk of terrorism, and explores whether the only viable option 
is to manage the risk as best as possible.  
 
Chapter Two will provide a theoretical foundation for the research study as well as a 
conceptualization of the key concepts of political risk and terrorism.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Perspectives and 
Conceptualization 
 
2.1 Introduction 
“As a general rule, the most successful man in life is the man who has the best 
information” (Disraeli, 1900:153).  
 
In future, the ability to manage and mitigate risk will probably become more important for 
international companies. Globalization, closer economic cooperation in the world and 
capital mobility have not made politics outdated. Risks such as the violent overthrow of 
governments, civil strife, war, civil war and terrorism will not disappear.  The world has 
become more complex and political and social changes are happening at a faster pace 
and this has led to increased risks to global stability. Thus, the importance of being able 
to successfully manage political and political-security risk has become more important 
(Bremmer & Keat, 2009). Risk management and mitigation are of extreme importance in 
the oil and gas industry where investments can easily exceed billions of dollars and can 
take years to complete. The success of the investment often depends on the appropriate 
use of risk management and mitigation (Berlin et al., 2003). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical foundation on which this 
research is based. This includes a study of rational choice theory and problem-solving 
and decision-making theory. The second part of this chapter will clarify the main 
concepts that will be used and provide a conceptualization of these. A conceptualization 
of key concepts like risk, political-security risk and terrorism is seen as essential to 
provide the in-depth knowledge needed understand the analysis that follows. 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Grounding: Rational Choice Theory and Problem-Solving 
and Decision-Making Theory 
Rational choice theory has for a long time been a dominant paradigm in economics, but 
this has in the last few decades moved to other disciplines such as Sociology and 
Political Science (Green, 2002:2). Traditional economic theory put forward the “rational 
man”. He was perceived to obtain information on the relevant aspects of his 
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environment; if not complete information, at least at an acceptable level of information. 
He was also well organized and had a solid system of preferences, which made him 
able to weigh up the alternatives available to him. Based on this information, he was 
then able to choose the alternative that best suited his preferences (Simon, 1955:99). 
This schematized model provides a foundation on which to erect a theory.  Rational 
choice theory is used as a tool, making it possible to understand the behaviour of 
humans. Normally rational choice theory starts with a consideration of the behaviour of a 
decision-making unit (Green, 2004:4); in the case of this research this unit consists of 
international oil and gas companies.  
 
A major part of the daily work of business managers in both international and national oil 
and gas companies is to make decisions and find solutions to problems that may arise. 
These can range from new petroleum laws affecting a company´s interest in a given 
country, to security questions regarding terrorism.  It is up to the managers to decide on 
the problems that need attention. They have to evaluate and choose the best alternative 
and decide what actions have to be taken to reach the company’s goal. Examples of this 
can be expanding to new regions, increasing production or/and making the company 
more profitable. Actions, like agenda setting, determining goals, and coming up with a 
plan of action, are generally referred to as problem solving, while evaluating and 
choosing are generally referred to as decision making (Simon, Dantzig, Hogarth, Plott, 
Schelling, Shepsle, Tversky & Winter 1987:11). When a company is planning to invest in 
a new country, a political risk analysis is often the first part of the decision-making 
process with a focus on optimizing the investment. Political risk assessment on the other 
hand focuses on issues that call for decisions concerning the execution of an investment 
in a new region; in general it deals with decision-making problems (Altier, 1999; Beroggi, 
1999; cited in Brink, 2004:31). Decision-making theory is according to Tversky and 
Kahneman “conceived as a normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a 
description of the behaviour of real people” (1986:251). Nevertheless, it is a tool that 
helps to provide knowledge about why certain decisions are taken.  
 
A common argument supporting normative analysis is that people in general are thought 
to be effective when pursuing their goals, especially when they are able to learn from 
former experiences. As a result, it seems sensible to describe choice as a maximization 
process. In this process a multinational oil and gas company is assumed to have a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
13	  	  
stable system of preferences and an ability to calculate which of the alternative courses 
of action available to the company that will provide the best outcome for the company 
(e.g. investments in new oil fields, the provision of new equipment, or expanding to new 
countries)  (Simon, 1955:99). Furthermore, competition favours individuals and 
organizations that act rationally. The best decisions will result in increased profits in a 
competitive environment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986:251). In the decision-making 
process the rational actor will focus on minimizing uncertainty by applying expert 
knowledge to the topic. If the decision-maker is not able to reduce the uncertainty to a 
level of reasonable risk, the investor will abstain from investing in the country or, if 
already in the country, will consider pulling out (Brink, 2004:30). These uncertainties 
may be a result of insufficient knowledge or of the process occurring in the decision-
making environment in question. A way to reduce this uncertainty is to follow the steps 
involved in decision-making. According to Chicken (1986) this involves conceptualizing a 
plan to invest in new projects or to expand already-existing operations, using either 
internal or external actors to conduct a study to determine the possible outcomes and to 
plan how to implement the decisions that have been taken (Chicken, 1986; cited in Brink 
2004:30).  
 
Simon et al. (1987) also come up with a six-step process to reduce uncertainty:  
 -­‐ Find out what the problems or opportunities are.  -­‐ Collect information. -­‐ Develop as many alternatives as possible.  -­‐  Evaluate the alternatives. -­‐ Decide which one is the best. -­‐ Implement the chosen alternative and follow up on it. 
             (Simon et al., 1987:11).  
 
A decision-maker has to consider different alternatives, calculate what might happen 
when applying different alternatives, resolve uncertainty that might occur and in this way 
come up with a solution that will satisfy the investors (Simon, 1979:511). Political risk 
analysis provides the decision-maker with information which highlights the different 
political risks that may affect the profitability of a project for the specific company. When 
the company has been provided with this information, strategies on how to manage 
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these risks have to be developed (Brink, 2004:30). This research study will address the 
uncertainties preventing oil and gas companies from successfully managing the risk of 
terrorism through the use of political-security risk management and mitigation tools.   
 
2.3 Risk 
In the 1980s the subject of risk started to become of great concern in all types of 
industries and was being discussed at all levels of government. A number of different 
kinds of risk emerged. These included investment risk, business risk, safety risk and 
political risk (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981:11). However, this research study will focus on 
political risk only. Risk by itself is often used to refer to a “change of injury, damage, or 
loss, compared with some previous standard” (Lax, 1983:8). Chicken (1996) 
supplements this definition and defines risk as “the manifestation of doubt regarding the 
frequency and consequences of undesirable events…”(cited in Brink, 2004:17). In 
addition, there are a number of very broad definitions of risk: for example: “Risk is the 
probability that any event will turn into measurable losses” (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:4).  
 
According to Hough , risk refers to uncertainty concerning a particular event and the 
consequences of this event (2008:1). The concepts ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ have at times 
been used as synonyms or have been seen as closely related concepts where they 
represent different levels of intensity or impact. The difference between risk and 
uncertainty has normally been based on outcome probability and is in fact seen as 
indicating two levels of uncertainty: that is, instances where the outcome probabilities 
are known and instances where these probabilities are unknown. As a result, the term 
‘risk’ should be used in situations where the probable outcomes are uncertain and where 
the outcome is to some extent unknown and will lead to negative outcomes (Hough, 
2008:4-5). According to Kaplan and Garrick (1981) risk involves both uncertainty and 
some type of damage or loss to an investor’s property. They use an equation to explain 
the difference between risk and uncertainty.    
 
Risk = uncertainty + damage (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981:12).  
 
An example is where several oil and gas companies are competing for an extraction 
concession from a given country. While the country´s government is deciding to whom 
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to give the concession, the companies are in a state of uncertainty but are not facing 
any risk. Uncertainty deals with a potential loss, while risk, on the other hand, deals with 
measurable probabilities. The difference between risk and uncertainty can sometimes 
be hard to distinguish and may seem rather academic, but there is one important 
difference. Both terms refer to future likelihoods, but with risk one is able to calculate 
probabilities and because of that one is able to protect and prepare for future 
eventualities; with uncertainty it is not possible to do this (Lax, 1983:8).  However, 
uncertainty can in some cases be a positive factor. If risk encompasses actions where 
the outcome is uncertain, then the risk taken in a profitable environment might be 
rewarded. If one is able to manage these uncertainties properly the possibility to exploit 
them becomes a reality (Brink, 2004:21).  Often smaller oil and gas companies are more 
willing than the larger ones to take the risk of investing in regions regarded as high risk.  
They accept the high risk in the hope of getting a high return (Bray, 2003:299).  Cairn 
Energy´s investments in the Sangu gas field in Bangladesh can be seen as a successful 
and profitable example, where high risk was rewarded with high returns2  (History 
Bangladesh, 2014).   
   
2.4 Political Risk 
The term ‘political risk’ is frequently used in international business literature, but 
agreement as to its meaning is, according to Kobrin (1979), limited to the implication of 
undesirable results arising from political activity. According to Alon and Martin (1998) 
three problems were identified in early definitions of the term. First, the political risk was 
too narrowly defined. Due to this the conceptualizations were inappropriate, wrong data 
was used, and the results were misinterpreted. Secondly, as stated in the previous 
section, the assumption that political risk only leads to negative outcome for the firm is 
not always correct. A number of scholars support this, including Robock (1971) and 
Fitzpatrick (1983). An example of this can be a transition from a communist regime to a 
market economy. It will be much easier for international oil and gas companies to get 
access to petroleum reserves in a country where a market economy has been 
introduced. The third argument is that the focus on government policies and political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In	  1994	  Cairn	  Energy	  signed	  a	  product	  sharing	  a	  contract	  for	  two	  blocks	  offshore	  Bangladesh.	  In1997	  they	  transferred	  their	  operations	  to	  Shell	  and	  the	  two	  companies	  went	  into	  a	  partnership	  to	  operate	  two	  new	  blocks	  (Cairn	  Energy,	  2014).	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events draws attention away from other causes of political risk (Alon & Martin, 1998:11; 
Brewer, 1981:5).  
 
The concept of political risk has been constantly changing since it was introduced. It has 
evolved from being general country risk to include more specific sub-classifications. 
Political risk is often confused with country risk, though they are quite different. Country 
risk can be described as sovereign, transfer and credit risk and differs from political risk 
in that it can refer to possible financial losses caused by complications arising from 
macro-economic events (Brink, 2004:19). Countries that have a good record of paying 
back loans pose less country risk and are able to  get access to new loans more easily 
than countries that have a lower creditworthiness. This shows that country risk indicates 
the inability to repay loans, while political risk on the other hand relates to a country´s 
unwillingness to do so. High levels of country risk do not necessary mean high levels of 
political risk, and vice versa (Brink, 2004:23).  
 
Political risk is most commonly thought of in the relationship between host government 
and foreign business companies (Kobrin, 1979:67; Fitzpatrick, 1983:249) and at its 
origin, nationalization and expropriation were seen as the two major sources of political 
risk (Alon et al., 2006:624).  The definition provided by Weston and Sorge (1972) 
illustrates this well: “Political risk arise from the actions of national governments which 
interfere with or prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or 
cause the confiscation of wholly and partially foreign-owned business property” (Weston 
& Sorge, 1972, cited in Kobrin, 1979:67). A number of other scholars agree with Weston 
and Sorge and define political risk as government interference in business affairs; they 
argue that this is the main direct cause of investor losses and this makes it the main 
cause of political risk (Poynter 1982; Robock 1971).  Other analysts have questioned 
this view and argue that too much attention is given to political instability. They argue 
that the events most commonly associated with such instability occur rather infrequently 
(Lax, 1983; Kobrin 1979, 1981). A focus only on dramatic events like coups or 
revolutions meant that less dramatic or eye-catching events, (but events which were  
equally damaging and happened more frequently), were overlooked and under-analyzed 
(Jakobsen, 2012:30; Kobrin, 1981:253). This was evident in Kobrin (1981), who 
conducted a survey among managers of large international companies, asking them to 
list twelve potential contingencies. The majority ranked civil disorder as number one and 
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external war as number two. None of the other contingencies even came close to these 
two (Kobrin 1981:252).  
 
A second category defines political risk in terms of events that are political acts and /or 
restrictions forced on the company. They identify political risk with factors such as direct 
violence, instability, or limitations placed upon foreign business. This can take the form 
of expropriation, discriminatory taxation or restrictions on remittance of profit, but it can 
also be non-focused, such as in the case of riots (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249).  
 
A third category focuses more on political risk in the terms of a whole environment rather 
than isolated events. This category is well represented by Robock (1971), who states 
that political risk exists when a disruption happens in the business environment due to 
political change. This is normally difficult to anticipate. This change is a risk if it affects 
the company’s goals or profits to a significant extent (Robock, 1971). An example of this 
was the devaluation of the Russian rouble in 1998. Leading economists had reassured 
international investors that the Russian government had the ability to repay bonds held 
by international investors. However on 17 August 1998 the Russian government 
devalued the rouble and declared a moratorium on payments to foreign creditors. The 
consequences for investors were immediate and devastating. According to Robock, 
political risk exists in international business:  “(1) when discontinuities occur in the 
business environment; (2) when these are difficult to anticipate; and (3) when they result 
from political change”(1971:7). There are also those who do not use a concrete 
definition, but acknowledge that the political conditions in a country may pose a risk to 
the company (Green & Smith, 1972). Still, most political risk authors agree, as stated in 
Brink (2004), that “political risk broadly supposes the probability that business will either 
earn less money, or suffer losses in profit as a result of stakeholders within a political 
system´s (in)action or reactions to events, decisions and policies”(2004:18)  
 
Political changes that do not affect the business environment should not be seen as 
political risks for international companies, since this goes against the characteristics 
identified in Robock´s definition. Frequent changes of government do not in themselves 
pose a threat to international companies. As Lax (1988) argues, the same goes for 
street protests and political violence, which are hardly ever directed against the business 
community; therefore business can continue as usual.  
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Since the 1990s scholars have began to recognize government intervention and policies 
as the most common forms of political risk. (Jakobsen, 2012; Butler & Joaquin, 1998; 
Wells, 1998). Nowadays low-key changes are a bigger threat to international companies 
than events staged by non-governmental groups, events such as terrorism, sabotage 
and kidnappings. This is despite the fact that mass expropriation has almost ceased to 
be a problem (Jakobsen, 2012:31). Even though terrorism does not affect businesses to 
the same extent as low-key government changes, it is of such a nature that when it first 
happens its effects are often very severe and can cost companies millions of dollars; in 
worst cases it can result in the killing of employees.   
 
Alon et al. (2006) state that the political risks facing international businesses can be 
identified along several fronts. These may include rules and regulations within a country; 
security issues; interstate or intrastate war; the economic policies of the government; 
trade barriers, etc. These are factors that affect all foreign companies in the country, but 
the extent to which the company is affected will depend on which sector the company is 
involved in (Alon et al. 2006:625). For example, an oil company will be more at risk of a 
terrorist attack or a civil war. The attacks on Baron Oil´s operations in the Nancy Burdine 
Maxine Fields in Colombia in 2013 show the importance of focusing on the risks 
resulting from terrorism3 (Mclvor, 2013). International banks and international financial 
trusts for their part will be more concerned with risks such as the balance of payments, 
hyperinflation, interest rate changes, and market liquidity when considering an 
investment. An example of this type of risk, as presented in Alon et al. (2006:629), is the 
40 per cent devaluation in currency that hit Brazil in 1999; this was caused by a bailout 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the same year, leading to an unfriendly 
investment climate.  
 
In this section a number of definitions have been presented. For the purpose of this 
study Simon´s (1982) definition will be used. This is because it differentiates between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Baron	  Oil	   is	   the	   largest	   operator	   at	   the	  Nancy	  Burdine	  Maxine	   Fields	   and	   at	   the	   end	   of	  2013	   experienced	   a	   number	   of	   attacks	   on	   its	   production	   facilities	   by	   the	   Colombian	  terrorist	   group	   Fuerzas	   Armadas	   Revolucionaria	   de	   Colombia	   (FARC).	   These	   caused	   a	  temporary	  halt	  in	  production	  and	  damaged	  the	  facilities.	  Several	  workers	  were	  injured	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  (Mclvor	  2013).	  	  	  	  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19	  	  
macro- and micro-political risk and because of its broad environmental scope, as will be 
explained below. Simon states that “political risk can be viewed as [resulting from] 
governmental or societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the 
host country, and negatively affecting either a selected group of, or the majority of, 
foreign business operations and investments” (1982:68). 
 
2.5 Political-Security Risk 
As seen above, political risk has evolved to  include conceptual changes, in order to 
adapt the discipline to fit into today’s world. A number of new types of risk have been 
identified; one of these is political-security risk (Lambrechts, Weldon & Boshoff, 
2010:110). The field of political-security risk is still relatively new and as a result, there is 
little literature on the subject. Fouché (2003:18) describes political-security risk as “those 
vulnerabilities that flow from the political risk (policy responses to security threats) that 
are found in a specific country […] these could include, amongst others, political actions 
such as unpopular legislation leading to widespread unrest, restrictions on political 
parties leading to civil unrest, labour actions and even terrorism”. Fouché (2003) further 
focuses on the political-security components of traditional political risk, even though 
political-security risk stands on its own as a separate type of political risk; it must include 
several political risk elements in order to provide a correct analysis.  
 
In his research study, Fouché discusses the two elements of national security and 
human security. These elements are incorporated by Lambrechts et al. to provide a 
more overarching definition. Lambrechts et al. (2010) divide political-security risk into 
three categories of security: transnational security, national security and human security. 
In transnational security the region is the main actor and factors likely to impact the 
region are analysed. An example of this is a border dispute. National security focuses on 
the state as the main actor and on problems that can arise both internally as well as 
externally. Human security sees the individual as the main actor and emphasizes the 
protection of individuals against threats such as ethnic rivalry. All these risks may evolve 
into risks affecting the investments of foreign companies. 
 
Both transnational security and national security fall within the traditional conception of 
security which has its origin in political realism; it identifies security from a state-centred 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20	  	  
perspective and limits the use of security to the military realm. This might include the 
protection of state territory and a focus on preserving national values and interests 
(Pringle & Lambrechts, 2011). As argued by Leone (2010:100), transnational security is 
also in line with a shift to a more post-sovereign focus on security; this looks at  a 
globalized, post-Cold-War scene where multi-level authorities and unexpected events 
are weakening state sovereignty. 
 
The last type or level of security is human security, seen by many as the major element 
in national security (Fouché, 2003:17; Mathur, 1996:333). Human security focuses on 
elements that are not emphasized by transnational and national security. After the cold 
war the focus shifted towards human security as the traditional security perspectives 
failed to match up to  the new security challenges in the world (Pringle & Lambrechts, 
2011: 55). Kaldor´s (2012) attempt to describe this new security challenge is useful: she 
argues that during the last decades of the twentieth century, the world and especially 
Africa and Eastern Europe, have witnessed the evolution of a new type of organized 
violence. She coins the term “new wars” to describe this type of violence (Kaldor, 
2012:1).  These “new wars” can be seen as different from earlier wars in “terms of their 
goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed”. Often these “new wars” are 
about identity politics, either religious or linguistic; they differ from the “old wars” where 
geo-political and ideological goals were the focus (Kaldor, 2012:7). One of the 
characteristics of these “new wars” has to do with how the mode of warfare has 
changed. As argued by Kaldor (2012:9), terrorism can be seen as a form of this new 
strategy. Through spectacular, often horrible, acts of violence terrorist groups are trying 
to generate fear and conflict.  
 
According to Fouché (2003), the main security challenges to the national interest 
emerge from issues related to mass-migration, political oppression and terrorism. As a 
result, the definition of security should reflect a broader view that takes into account the 
need for freedom from vulnerability in modern society (Fouché, 2003.17).  The human 
security approach tries to change the traditional idea of security, where the focus is on 
national and regional stability, to put more emphasize on the human being. This means 
that the main challenges no longer have to do with military forces; the primary threats 
are now seen as domestic. These include human rights violations, economic failure and 
political discrimination. National security is no longer guaranteed only by military power, 
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but also depends on political, social and economic conditions (Tadjbakhsh, 2005:5). 
Uzodike and Isike (2009) sum it up well: “The human security conceptualization 
accommodates a wide range of issues that not only constitute threats to human 
existence, but also breed insecurity and societal anarchy” (2009:106).  
 
Transnational security, national security and human security are not mutually exclusive, 
as Pringle and Lambrechts argue (2011), but mutually reinforce each other. Each 
element  is important; together these elements  bring about a better definition of 
security. Pringle and Lambrechts combine these three elements  in a comprehensive 
definition of political security risk:  
 
Political-security risk consists of interrelated security risks, including transnational, 
national and human security. It is caused or influenced by government or societal 
political decisions, politics, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen events and 
can originate either within or outside the host country, [impacting either a selected 
foreign company or a selected group of foreign companies]” (Pringle & 
Lambrechts, 2011:56). 
 
This research study will focus more on the security elements of political risk and on 
the political-security risk branch of political risk. Thus this definition will be used and 
in conjunction with the previously stated definition of political risk.  
 
2.6 Macro and Micro Political Risk 
When investing abroad, international companies may encounter both macro- and micro-
political risks. An unexpected change in the political environment that affects all foreign 
businesses is called macro-political risk.  A micro-risk is identified as an environmental 
change that affects only a specific industry or a specific company (Robock, 1971:9). 
Examples of macro-risk are large-scale disruptive socio-political events like revolutions, 
interstate and intrastate wars and substantial changes to  investment rules affecting all 
foreign companies in the country. Examples of micro-risk include selective expropriation, 
terrorist attacks against oil and gas installations, tax increases aimed at oil companies, 
and price controls for utilities (Jakobsen, 2012:38). Macro-risks can be irregular and 
indirect. Especially when a country is experiencing political unrest, foreign companies 
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are tempting targets for groups from all parts of the political spectrum. On several 
occasions, the property of foreign investors has been damaged to embarrass the regime 
in power. An example of this type of indirect political risk took place in Argentina in 1969, 
when several US companies that owned supermarkets were bombed as a consequence 
of the visit of Governor Rockefeller to Buenos Aires (on behalf of President Nixon). The 
supermarkets were owned by a company Rockefeller had founded (Robock, 1971:9).   
 
Macro-risk can be further divided into two categories, internal and external risk. Internal 
risk focuses on causes that are domestically generated, while external risk can be 
attributed to the home country, a third country, or to the global environment (Alon & 
Martin, 1998). Simon (1982) took these two approaches and combined them and 
concluded that political risk can result from either society-related or governmental-
related factors. 
 
Robock´s (1971) differentiation between macro-political risk and micro- political risk was 
an important as it demonstrated to international investors the importance of paying 
attention to subtle changes in industry-specific conditions, as opposed to changes 
brought about by large-scale catastrophic events (Simon, 1982:66). It also showed the 
broad scope of political risk, extending from revolutions which may affect all foreign 
businesses to a tax law that affects only one (or a few) foreign businesses. The risks 
generated by military or social groups, through military coups or revolutions, can evolve 
into  macro-risks if the new government chooses to nationalize or expropriate foreign 
businesses, but this is more the exception than the rule. More common is selective 
nationalization or “creeping” nationalization and indigenization (Simon, 1982:67). Kobrin 
(1981) argues that most of the political risks faced by foreign companies entail micro- 
rather than macro-risks and mostly affect operations rather than ownership (Kobrin, 
1981:253). Kobrin (1984) analyzes expropriations between 1960 and 1976 and argues 
that the actual extent of expropriations has been surprisingly limited. In the period 
between 1960 and 1976 only five per cent of all firms owned by foreign investors in 
developing countries were expropriated; in most cases this happened at the beginning 
of the 1970s. However, after 1975 there was a remarkable decrease (Kobrin, 1984:329). 
Kobrin´s assumption that the decline would continue was confirmed by Minor (1994), 
who looked at data from the period between 1980 and 1992. The data indicated that it 
was unlikely that expropriation would resurface in the near future. Since the 1990s 
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developing countries have increased the degree of protection of foreign companies from 
expropriation. The broad trend in developing countries towards privatizing state-owned 
firms indicates that the governments are unlikely to disrupt private-sector activity and 
enter into state ownership (Minor, 1994: 177). Even though there has been a decline in 
the number of expropriations, the risk of expropriation is still present. According to 
Bremmer and Keat (2009) a clear “convergence” process where privatization becomes 
the order of the day is unlikely to happen anytime soon. The environment of foreign 
investment is becoming more diversified and complex (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:125). In 
2006 the Ecuadorian government expropriated all the assets at block 15 from the 
American oil company Occidental Petroleum (Oxy Drops Petro-Ecuador Suit, Focuses 
on Government Case, 2006). These cases demonstrate that expropriations still occur. 
Although expropriations have been in steady decline since the beginning of the 90s, 
they still are responsible for 84 per cent of the amount paid out in risk insurance by the 
American Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (Bremmer & Keat, 
2009:125).  Thus, the risk of expropriation is still present, although there has  been a 
decline in the last couple of decades.  
 
 According to Jakobsen (2012), this distinction between macro- and micro-risk more or 
less follows the earlier division between those who claimed that political instability was 
the main political risk and those who believed that the risk of government intervention 
was more important. Events associated with macro-risk often tend to be more 
spectacular and eye-catching, and are of course important in their own right, while 
micro-political risks stem from less high-profile and less newsworthy events. These 
occur more frequently and often inflict much higher losses on the affected firms. It is 
more common to encounter micro-political risk; this is in contrast to comprehensive 
expropriation, such as mass nationalization, which has been in decline. But even though 
it is declining such risk it still exists. An example is the Bolivian nationalization of the 
country´s gas fields (Alon et al., 2006:626), which was the beginning of the 
nationalization of all foreign-owned energy reserves in the country. 
 
Micro-political risk can also be referred to as industry-specific risk, or it can be referred 
to as firm-specific risk as done by Berlin, Berlin and Vrooman (2003). The risk varies 
from industry to industry and, according to Lambrechts, Weldon and Boshoff (2010), two 
factors are likely to affect political risk over time. The first is that the higher the share of 
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foreign-owned businesses in a country, the greater the change that the industry will 
experience from increasing micro-political risk. Secondly, the more skilled the local 
workforce and the more it is able to run the businesses successfully, the higher the 
micro-risk becomes (Lambrechts et al., 2010:112). In this study the focus will be on 
micro-risks, since terrorism in the oil and gas industry, which is the focus of this 
research, is most often targeted at specific facilities, such as oil tankers, pipelines or oil 
and gas refineries.  The next section will provide a more thorough explanation of 
industry- and firm-specific risk. 
 
2.6.1 Industry- or Firm-Specific Risk 
Frynas and Mellahi recognize that the risk to companies varies according to the type of 
project, the kind of company, even the product lines (2003:542). As stated by Kobrin, 
“the impact of most political events varies from firm to firm and from project to project” 
(Kobrin, 1982:40). In their study Robock and Simmonds (1989) found out that significant 
political risk in some countries affected some types of businesses less than others. An 
example is the political unrest in El Salvador in the 1970s and 1980s (Robock & 
Simmonds, 1989). Robock and Simmonds are supported by Kobrin (1980) who states 
that in several cases companies chosen for expropriation were selected according to 
their type of business. Specific companies were expropriated for specific reasons. 
Frynas and Mellahi state this clearly: “It has been recognized in general terms that risk 
assessment, as part of the investment decision process, is highly project-specific and 
occasionally firm-specific or even product-specific” (2003:542). Frynas and Mellahi 
conclude, by looking at oil companies in Nigeria, that companies exposed to the same 
political events may be affected differently, depending on the resources and capabilities 
available to the company. They found that Shell had an advantage in Nigeria because 
they considered political risk to be a firm-specific risk and their interest in investing in 
Nigeria may to some extent be explained by their firm-specific risk assessment or their 
capacity to reduce risk (2003:559). In addition, Alon and Herbert (2009) argue that 
guidelines for a systematic approach to assessing the specific risks facing a specific firm 
are sorely lacking. Frynas and Mellahi state that scholars should put more focus on 
studying political risk at the firm level instead of only at country and industry level 
(2003:562). They are supported by Alon and Herbert (2009) who argue that surprisingly 
little research has been done to identify firm-specific political risks. 
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Alon et al. (2006) look at the industry-specific risks relating to the oil and gas sectors 
and argue that the oil and gas industry is one of the most sensitive sectors to invest in 
(2006:631). They are supported by Moran (1998: 70) who states that, because the 
resources involved often are viewed as part of a country´s national patrimony, 
investments in this sector are more likely to affect the country more than other 
investments (due to the wealth and power that accrues from the production of oil. The oil 
and gas industry faces a number of risks; these include corruption, terrorism, 
repatriation restrictions, government regulations and environmental activism, to name a 
few. These are macro risks that can affect almost all sectors, but risk variables. such as 
oil embargos, restrictions on oil export, energy vulnerability and environmental activism 
are specific to the energy sector (Berlin et al., 2003; Alon et al., 2006). As Berlin et al. 
state (2003:2), political risk plays an increasingly important role since the production of 
oil is linked to the geopolitical location of reserves; major reserves are located in 
politically unstable regions of the world. Oil and gas companies are willing to be exposed 
to a high degree of risk as long as they are able to manage the risk and make money 
(Alon et al., 2006:632).  
 
It is of crucial importance that international companies are able to reduce their 
vulnerability to political risks. The importance of this can clearly be seen in the terrorist 
attack against Statoil´s In Amenas facilities; as explained in the first chapter, this attack 
will be the focus of this study. To organize a terrorist attack against a whole industry is 
almost impossible. Risk at the macro-level usually applies to bigger entities or events 
like governments, war or civil war and the like. It is easier for terrorist groups to conduct 
attacks against specific companies, like Statoil in In Amenas. Because terrorist attacks 
against companies normally centre on one facility, owned by one company or a few 
companies, it is natural that the focus in this research study will be on industry-specific 
risk. To be able to reduce their vulnerability to this risk, companies need a risk-
management and mitigation framework. In the next section these two concepts will be 
outlined. 
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2.7 Risk Management and Mitigation 
Risk management is one of the most important objectives of oil and gas companies with 
investments all over the world (Miller, 1992:311). In today’s global marketplace it is 
crucial that international companies and investors consider the political risks involved 
when making investments. Risk must be continuously assessed in international 
companies’ decision-making processes. For companies to decide on the best way to 
manage and mitigate risk, it is of the utmost importance to ensure the success of new 
investments or to grow already-existing foreign investments (Berlin et al., 2003:1). 
Haendel (1979:135) defines risk management as “identifying risks, assigning a value to 
them, anticipating losses, and making objective decisions about what steps to take 
before losses occur so that they have the least impact on the operations of the 
enterprise ”.   
 
Political risk management can be seen as the preventive actions international 
companies and investors take to keep the risks associated with their investments and 
activities at an acceptable level (Brink, 2004:149). These activities include: the 
implementation of plans to expand abroad; the host state’s reaction to these activities; 
and different policy actions that have a negative impact on the profitability of expansion. 
From a political-security risk-management perspective, actions from non-state actors, 
like terrorist groups; or political discontent at state authorities (leading to riots and 
military actions by foreign military forces), are activities that must be at an acceptable 
level before a company chooses to invest. Political-security risk management is 
especially important in the oil and gas industry, because the world´s oil and gas 
reserves are located in regions of the world that are seen as unstable (Berlin, et. al., 
2003:2). The largest oil and gas reserves in the world can be found in the Middle East, 
in the former Soviet states, in South Asia and in Africa (Luft & Korin, 2003). These are 
regions where countries have experienced a number of successful or foiled terrorist 
attacks.  
 
There are a number of different ways to protect a company against political and political-
security risk. Accordingly, the decision on what mitigation measures to take has to be 
made after a thorough assessment and consideration of the different factors that may 
affect the company´s investments in the host country (Berlin, et. al., 2003:6). According 
to Berlin et. al (2003), there are two ways to manage political risk. The first is through 
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political risk insurance or through what Berlin et al. call de facto insurance. This can be 
described as the protection provided by well-thought-out partnering or planning. Political 
insurance does not focus on preventing a loss, but rather on ensuring that the investors 
are compensated for losses that might occur. De facto political insurance on the other 
hand tries to prevent losses from occurring in the first place. Political risk insurance and  
political insurance are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other in many 
instances (Berlin et al., 2003:6). Berlin et al. (2003) two ways to manage political risk 
has much in common with Brink´s (2004) two techniques. Brink distinguishes between 
integrative and protective management of political risk. Integrative techniques focus on 
limiting the frequency of loss and the main objective is to influence relations with the 
political leadership in a given country. Protective techniques are concerned with 
minimizing the severity of losses and focus on securing the internal strengths of (in this 
research study) international oil and gas companies.  
 
The aim of integrative techniques is to increase the integration of the company into the 
host country. The idea is that the host government then will look at the company as 
being less foreign and this (it is hoped) will reduce the risk of government intervention. 
Examples of integrative techniques used by international companies include local 
sourcing; following good labour policies; making a thorough expatriate selection; 
encouraging export promotion and engaging in joint ventures with local state companies 
(Brink, 2004:156). In the oil and gas industry joint ventures are very common. At 
Statoil´s gas extraction facilities in In Amenas, Statoil is now engaged in a joint venture 
with the state-owned company Sonatrach and with BP (Statoil, 2013b).  
 
The aim of protective techniques is to deter the host government from placing 
restrictions on the international company. In cases where the government does interfere, 
the goal is to minimize losses and to hinder the integration of the foreign company into 
the host country’s environment. Examples of this strategy include withholding 
technology as long as possible; subcontracting parts of the production process; and 
making use of financial tools. This may mean involving other companies in the venture 
and gradually entering new countries (Brink, 2004:157). As with Berlin et al., the two 
techniques described by Brink (2004) can be combined: it is in the interest of the 
international company to come up with a risk management strategy that combines 
integrative and protective techniques for the country it is planning to invest in.   
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The tendency among companies has been to conduct risk analysis as a response to a 
specific situation rather than maintaining a constant political risk management function. 
These forecasts on request come as a response to the particular needs of investors. 
The request normally comes when new investments or the upgrading of existing 
investments are considered. Due to the failure to look at risk management as an 
ongoing function, including the observation of changes and the continuous updating of 
analysis, companies often fail to manage problems before they become apparent. Often 
international companies react to incidents when they occur, instead of trying to forecast 
and prepare for incidents that might happen in the future. After the company has made 
the investment, the different political risks that might face the company are often given 
little attention, until a severe incident happens which affects the company´s assets (Lax, 
1983:174).  This is evident in the case of the In Amenas terrorist attack. According to 
Bousso (2013), Statoil had for years a political risk unit that was part of the 
communication department, but according to a source in the company this was 
recognized more as a PR issue and less as a risk-management tool.  
 
When looking at the number of incidents and the importance of political events affecting 
the international oil and gas industry, one would hope that companies were making an 
effort to develop political risk management strategies. However, despite having 
recognized the risks, many companies still have not advanced beyond forecasting 
political developments (Lax, 1983:174). Companies extracting oil and gas have little 
freedom when it comes to managing political-security risks. These companies operate in 
an industry that has to extract the raw materials where they are found; they cannot 
choose to move their production facilities out of the country if something happens, like 
for example expropriation, or substantial changes in investment rules, or in the event of 
interstate war, revolutions, terror attacks, etc. However, this does not mean that oil and 
gas companies have no way of minimizing their risks. Their risk management tools 
might be limited, but the companies are able to take an active role in reducing their 
vulnerability to political-security risks. One of the most severe political-security risks that 
oil and gas companies face is the risk of terrorist attacks. In the next section the term 
‘terrorism’ will be discussed as well as the evolution of the concept over the last century 
will be explored. 
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2.8 Terrorism 
In this research study the aim is to find out how terrorism affects political-security risk 
management and mitigation in the oil and gas sectors. To be able to do this one has to 
have clarity about the concept of terrorism. The purpose of this section is to provide this 
clarity.  
 
The term ‘terrorism’ has caused confusion and contradiction ever since  it was 
introduced into the political vocabulary. The main reason for this is that the meaning of 
the term has changed frequently over the years. The origin of the word can be traced 
back to the French revolution and the “reign of terror” (la Terreur),but it has since 
acquired different meanings for different people at different times (Gupta, 2008:5). After 
the Second World War the term ´terrorism´ mostly referred to the violent uprisings that 
were conducted by various nationalist and anti-colonialist groups in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East, in opposition to European rule in the late 1940s and 1950s. Algeria, Israel 
and Kenya are some of the countries that obtained their independence partially thanks 
to national groups that employed ‘terrorism’ against their colonial rulers. It was during 
this period that the term ´freedom fighter´ became fashionable. Many of the newly 
independent third world countries argued that any people who fought against colonial 
oppression should rather be regarded as ´freedom fighters´. In the 1960s and 1970s 
terrorism was still being used in a revolutionary context, but now the context expanded 
to include ethnic separatist and nationalist groups that were not part of a colonial or neo-
colonial struggle. Groups such as FLQ (Front de Liberation du Quebec) and ETA 
(Euskadita Askatasuna) were now defined as ‘terrorist’ (Whittaker, 2007:6). In the early 
1980s terrorism was extended to include less distinct phenomena and came to be 
regarded as calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a bigger global 
conspiracy. After a number of suicide bombings against American embassies and 
military bases in the Middle East in the mid-1980s, the focus shifted to state-sponsored 
terrorism. States such as Iran, Iraq and Syria became active sponsors of terrorist 
attacks. Terrorism came to be seen as a form of surrogate warfare where smaller states 
were able to challenge more powerful states (Whittaker, 2007:7). Since the meaning and 
usage of the term have changed over the decades, it is not very surprising that it has 
become increasingly difficult to define. 
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In an often cited book published in 1988, Schmid and Jongman looked at 109 different 
definitions of terrorism and found an extreme lack of uniformity among the definitions 
provided by state agencies, academic scholars and a number of think tanks (Schmid & 
Jongman, 1988).  Below is a selection of different definitions which show the broad 
spectrum: 
 -­‐ “The use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause, of action designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or 
a section of the public, which involve serious violence against any person or 
serious damage to property” (Security Service, MI5, n.d.). 
 -­‐ “The threatened or actual use of force or violence to attain a political goal through 
fear, coercion or intimidation” (Russell, Banker & Miller, 1979: 4). 
 -­‐ “ Involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens violence. It is 
designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the 
immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable 
organization […] involving a non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, 
the victim or both” (Bhatt, 2007:14). 
 
-­‐ ”The repeated use of politically motivated violence with coercive intent, by non-
state actors, that affects more than one state” (Badey, 1998:92). 
 
As seen here, there is a wide range of definitions attempting to conceptualize ‘terrorism’.  
 
On September 11, 2001 the US experienced the most devastating terrorist attack in its 
history. Approximately 3,000 people were killed. This is a large number, but compared to 
the number of murders in the US every year it pales into insignificance. Over 14 000 
people were murdered in the US in 2012 (FBI, 2012). Despite the fact that more people 
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were killed in the US in 2012 than there were terrorist deaths worldwide4, terrorism 
receives a tremendous amount of attention. One of the reasons for this is that terrorism 
varies from other types of violence in its extra-normal quality. Thornton explains, 
“terrorism […] lies beyond the norms of violent political agitation that are accepted by a 
given society” (1964:76). Acts of terrorism are both politically and socially intolerable. 
Terrorist attacks are frequently extremely brutal and psychologically shocking. This may 
include mutilation of victims, the use of suicide bombers, and throat cutting. The attacks 
are normally aimed at the civilian population and happen unexpectedly, making them 
difficult to predict. These factors make terrorist attacks unacceptable and abnormal 
(Crenshaw, 2011:23). The psychological aspect of terrorism attracts a lot of the 
attention. Terrorism creates an extreme fear in the minds of people. This fear is not 
primarily intended for the terrorist victims, but for a larger audience that might not even 
know the victims. An important aim of the terrorist attacks is to create fear in a 
population (Ruby, 2002:11). According to Crenshaw (2011:23), these attacks are 
intended to affect the political behaviour and views of a particular group or of several 
groups in order realise the goals of the terrorist organization. The most important target 
is the civilian population, which is easy to access and where it is possible to harm a 
large number of victims.  
 
In this research study the definition of terrorism provided by the US State Department, 
will be used: “Politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets 
by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” 
(US Department of State, 2012). This definition is composed of three key criteria. The 
first is that terrorism must be politically motivated. Terrorism has been regarded as “the 
continuation of politics by other means” (Bhatt, 2007:15). Bhatt (2007) argue that the 
most important elements separating terrorist attack from other types of violence is the 
political goals of the terrorist organization. 
 The second criterion is that the violence is directed against non-combatants. Non-
combatants are people who are not part of the military or military members who are not 
part of military hostilities. Here terrorism is seen as attacks waged against the civilian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses for Terrorism (2013), there 
were 11 098 casualties worldwide in 2012. Although casualties were recorded in 85 countries, over half of 
all the fatalities (62%) took place in only three countries: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq (2013).  
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population, which is not prepared to defend themselves against such attacks (Ruby, 
2002: 10). 
 
 The third criterion is that perpetrators are a sub-national group or clandestine agents. 
This means that the political violence carried out by nation-states is not regarded as 
terrorism. This includes attacks where civilians might be killed (e.g. the NATO bombing 
of Libya in 2011). This part of the definition is more controversial than the others. The 
US support of the Contras in Nicaragua (who spread fear among the population 
regarding what would be done to them if they joined the Sandanista rebel group) can be 
seen as an example on how this part of the definition is  sometimes less than 
satisfactory (Held, 2004:63). According to Ruby (2002) national entities fit into the 
clandestine description just as sub-national entities do.  If agents from one state bomb a 
grocery store in another country in order to change the policies of that country, this does 
not fit into the sub-national group description, but will be regarded as terrorism 
nevertheless (Ruby, 2002:11). The most important element here is that terrorist groups 
behave in a clandestine way.  
 
Terrorist acts become attractive when it seems there is no other means left to achieve 
the goals of the group. Terrorism can sometimes be seen as a tool to be used in states 
where there is no political freedom for opponents of the regime (e.g. FLN struggle 
against the French colonial regime). However terrorism also happens in countries where 
political opposition is allowed (e.g. 9/11 attack in the US in 2001, the London bombings 
in 2005). The definition of the term ‘terrorism’ has been the centre of discussion for 
decades, but according to Whittaker people agree on one point: “ [terrorism] is a word 
with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one´s enemies and 
opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore” 
(2007:7). The aim of this section has been to provide a deeper understanding of the 
evolution of the complex concept of terrorism and to give an insight into an ongoing 
debate. In this research study the definition by the US State Department will be used on 
account of its simplicity and because it matches the terrorist attack in the case study.   
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2.9 Conclusion  
The objective of this chapter was to give a conceptualization of the key terminology, as 
well as to clarify the theoretical grounding of this research study.  Rational choice theory, 
problem-solving and decision-making theory have been examined to create the 
theoretical framework for the research. This was followed by a conceptualization of the 
key terminology that will be used in this study. The concepts include risk, political risk, 
political-security risk, macro- and micro-risk with a focus on industry- or firm-specific risk. 
Due to its significance in this research study, risk management and mitigation and 
terrorism were also conceptualized. These concepts set the foundation for the chapters 
that follow. In Chapter Three, Statoil´s history in Algeria will be contextualized and a 
thorough study of the history of terrorism in Algeria will be provided, focusing on the 
terrorist group, The Masked Brigade, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and responsible for 
the In Amenas attack.  
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Chapter Three: Terrorism in Northern Africa, with Focus on 
the Oil and Gas Industry  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to contextualize the impact of terrorism on the oil and gas 
industry as well as to trace the evolution of terrorism in North Africa and more 
specifically in Algeria. The aim is to better understand the events leading up to the 
attack on In Amenas in January 2013. The chapter will firstly give an overview of the 
development of terrorism in Northern Africa and show how the countries in the region 
have been affected by it. The second section will focus on Algeria to give a more in-
depth understanding of the situation regarding terrorism in that country and to give an 
overview of the terrorist groups that have been most active in the country. Section three 
will look at the oil and gas industry as a target for terrorist groups. The period from 
Osama bin Laden´s declaration of war against the West in 1996 until the present will be 
the main focus of this section. Section four will look at Statoil´s history, with a focus on 
the company´s international investments. This will be followed by a summary of Statoil´s 
involvement in Algeria and a detailed review of the four-day siege at In Amenas. To 
understand the complexity of political-security risk mitigation and management it is 
important to understand the actions of terrorist groups regarding oil and gas companies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an in-depth understanding of how terrorism has 
affected the North African region, and Algeria in particular, as well as the global oil and 
gas industry in general.         
3.2 Terrorism in Northern Africa 
Terrorism is not a new threat to countries and companies in North Africa and it started 
long before the September 11 attacks in the US. However, before 2001 terrorism in 
North Africa was contained and localized. Since then, North African terrorism has 
become much more complex, bringing together religious ideology and criminal networks, 
with terrorist groups capable of operating both locally and globally (CSIS, 2010). As can 
be seen on the overview map below, the Maghreb region comprises Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya and Morocco; its geographical position between Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa means that developments in the area influence millions of people all over the 
world, and, as international oil and gas companies expand their activities in North 
African countries, the threat from local terrorist groups grows. Since 2001 there have 
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been numerous attacks against oil and gas companies in the Maghreb region, making it 
a high-risk region to invest in5. 
Map 3.1: Overview of the Maghreb region (Senussi & Ziemba, 2010). 
 
After the 9/11 attacks in New York, terrorist attacks in the Maghreb region increased by 
600 per cent, leading to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) special session in 
March 2013. There the UNSC warned that an “arc of instability” was spreading in 
Northern Africa: “if left unchecked, it could transform the continent into a breeding 
ground for extremists and become a launch pad for larger-scale terrorist attacks around 
the world” (SC/11004, 2013). This spread is especially evident in the countries bordering 
the Sahara and Sahel region (Alexander, 2014).  
 
 The origin of modern terrorism in the Maghreb region can in many ways be traced back 
to the violent anticolonial struggles that convulsed North Africa in the twentieth century, 
as well as North Africans returning from Afghanistan after the war against the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s, which continued fighting their own governments and the West. 
According to CSIS (2010), the combination of well-trained fighters and a very strict 
religious ideology produced a dangerous environment where violence and extremism 
thrived. The consequence of this unpredictable mix was that almost 150 000 people died 
in the conflict between the Algerian government and Islamic insurgents in the 1990s. 
Algeria´s experience with this brutal violence was unique, but terrorism also affected the 
other countries in the region.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Appendix A: Attacks against the oil and gas industry in the Maghreb region: 2001-2011 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
36	  	  
 
Not long after the 9/11 terrorist attack, Tunisia and Morocco were targeted in massive 
terrorist bombings, proving that no country in Northern Africa was safe from terrorism.  
During the 1990s terrorism in North Africa had almost exclusively a local focus.  At the 
beginning of the new century the interests and activities of the different terrorist 
organizations expanded to involve Europe, Iraq and Afghanistan. Apart from Algerian 
groups, Moroccan terrorists were involved in the train bombing in Madrid in 2004, and a 
number of Tunisians have been deeply involved in fundraising for terrorist operations; in 
addition many Libyans went to Afghanistan to collaborate with Al Qaeda (CSIS, 2010).  
 
Significant resources have found their way to North African terrorist groups, as a result 
of donations from wealthy al-Qaeda supporters in the Gulf States and from foreign 
procurement networks. At the same time, the ideology of the terrorist groups in North 
Africa has shifted away from the unpopular local struggle to focus on a pan-Islamic 
global jihadism (holy war) (Taheri, 2008). The Maghreb region’s historical legacy with its 
anti-colonial struggle has provided a sound basis upon which different terrorist groups 
can build a new plan to further their struggle. The unpopular wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have given rise to a new wave of veterans who could be recruited. An 
example of this was the Afghan veteran, and now leader of the Masked Brigade, 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar. These veterans bring with them valuable skills in urban fighting 
and arms smuggling to the Maghreb region. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also gave 
the terrorist groups a pretext for jihad; they were easily deployed against what they saw 
as a Western striving for a Middle-Eastern hegemony (Pham, 2008). The invasions 
fuelled extremist ideology and led to the spread of terrorism in North Africa (CSIS, 
2010). The two wars also led to a consolidation of many local terrorist groups in North 
Africa. Islamist groups in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania became subsumed by 
the larger AQIM. AQIM has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the 
Maghreb and has stated as a goal the need to attack Western targets (Hansen & Vriens, 
2009). All the above-mentioned factors have led to a rise in the frequency, sophistication 
and spread of North African terrorism. According to Taheri (2008), terrorism in North 
Africa has begun to impose itself as a “new arc of terror” spreading to both Europe and 
North America. Many of the central figures from North African terrorist groups are 
Algerians or are based in Algeria. Since its independence in 1962 up to the present, the 
country has been the epicentre for terrorist recruitment and attacks in Northern Africa.  
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3.3 The History of Terrorism in Algeria 
For decades terrorism in Algeria has made world news. To understand the origins of the 
chaos and why Algeria have evolved to a hotspot for terrorist activities in the North 
African region, it is important to take a closer look at the country´s history since 
independence. 
 
After a violent liberation struggle, Algeria gained its independence from France in July 
1962, bringing the National Liberation Front (FLN) to power. The FLN had been the 
main Algerian nationalist movement fighting for independence and in August the same 
year the FLN formed a new government under the leadership of Ahmed Ben Bella.  
During Ben Bella´s term, Algeria became increasingly socialist and authoritarian, and in 
1965 he was overthrown by Houari Boumediene. Boumediene continued the trend from 
Ben Bella´s period, but was more dependent on the military. He also reduced the 
importance of FLN´s role, from being the only legal party, to a merely symbolic one. 
Following the death of Boumediene in 1979, Chadli Bendjedid became President.  
Under the leadership of Bendjedid Arabisation was promoted in the Algerian society. 
They imported Muslim scholars from Egypt and Syria to ´Arabise` the French-speaking 
country; this spread radical Islamism and played an important role in the development of 
political Islamism (Botha, 2008:24). In the 1980s the oil price dropped and Algeria with 
its oil-dependent economy was badly hit; the country went into an economic recession, 
leading to social unrest. These events forced Bendjedid to introduce a multiparty party 
system and in 1989 a municipal election was held. After the election the Islamist party 
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) became the main political force. Their goal of setting up 
an Islamic state in Algeria caused considerable concern among the military leaders and 
other sections of society, who feared becoming expiatory victims of a possible Islamic 
regime that was based on righteousness. In the 1991 parliamentary election the FIS was 
announced as the winner of the first round. The army intervened by removing Bendjedid 
from office and banning the FIS. The army argued that this had to be done to safeguard 
democracy (Martinez, 2000:1-2). The annulment of the election and the attempt by the 
government to destroy the FIS have been seen as the key events leading to the spread 
of terrorism in Algeria (Cilliers, 2003:95). The situation in Algeria in the mid-1990s was 
chaotic. As stated by Whittaker (2007:154), in the period between 1992 and 1996 
approximately 120 000 people were killed in what can be described as a terrorist 
insurgency, with shocking cruelty on both sides.  
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3.3.1 The Development of Radical Islam in Algeria 
The emergence of radical Islam in the years following the independence, can  largely be 
attributed to the disillusionment of a considerable part of the population with the 
prolonged rule of the FLN (Cilliers, 2003:95). A number of political, socio-economic and 
cultural developments during FLN rule affected the development of fundamentalist and 
extremist organizations in Algeria. There are many reasons for this, and to mention all 
here would be too extensive. Accordingly, only some of the most important 
developments will be touched upon.  
 
One of these developments was the continuing deterioration of the socio-economic 
conditions. At the end of the 1970s, unemployment rates started to rise; in 1985 and 72 
per cent of the unemployed were aged 25 years or younger. This is a dramatic number, 
especially since that age group was estimated to comprise 65 per cent of the population 
(Stora, 2004:193-194). After independence, Algeria embraced a single-party system. 
This made it difficult for the younger generations to  influence political developments in 
the country. President Houaru Boumedienne banned political parties and organizations 
that had been allowed after independence and focused more on the military elite 
(Shahin, 1997:114). Conditions became even worse under President Chadli Benjedid, 
leading to the establishment of Islamic fundamentalist and extremist groups. There was 
a lack of leadership, and growing dissatisfaction with the fact that many important official 
positions were reserved for members of the FLN; oil prices increased and there was 
rapid population growth. Combined with rising corruption, these are just some of factors 
contributing to the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria.   
 
3.3.2 The Role of the Army 
The army was an important factor in the development of extremist organizations in 
Algeria. Since independence the army had played a key role in government, becoming 
part of the centre of authority in Algeria. The army was given the role of protector of the 
regime and it was the guardian of public order and stability (Shahin, 1997:128). This 
central position made it easy for the military to intervene after the municipal elections in 
1989. Even before the elections, riots were taking place in a number of Algerian cities 
and the army was worried that this would lead to further political unrest. In response it 
declared  a state of emergency. In reality, the army had turned Algeria into a police 
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state. By placing restrictions on the development of a political culture and disallowing 
questioning and disagreement, the army threatened freedom of speech (Botha, 
2008:26). After the riots in 1988 President Bendjedid decided to establish a multi-party 
system in the hope of preventing further unrest, but this did not go as planned and the 
army removed the government in 1992 (Martinez, 2000:2).   
 
A number of important organizations have been involved in terrorism in Algeria: what 
follows is an outline of the most influential groupings.  
 
3.3.3 The Return of the Mujahideen  
After almost a decade fighting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union withdrew 
in 1989, leading to the return of veterans to Northern Africa. Algeria was one of the 
countries that was most affected. The spread of radical fundamentalism was initially 
financed by Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia. There was then a shift to private 
radical financiers, such as Osama bin Laden. During the final years of the war in 
Afghanistan, many hardened war veterans returned home. Estimates of their number 
vary from 600 to 3,000. Upon their return to Algeria they formed the core of the terrorist 
groups that would promote violence (Cilliers, 2010; Martinez, 2006). When they returned 
they wore, in contrast to the rest of the population, Afghan-style clothing; with their long 
beards and turbans they became known as ‘les Afghanis’. (Botha, 2008:32). Previously 
the extremist groups in Algeria had focused more on internal issues, after the return of 
the veterans these organizations reoriented their focus. Botha (2008), argues against 
the importance of the war veterans as a factor explaining the trouble in Algeria. She 
argues that although the Mujahideen veterans played a key role in the formation of 
important radical groups such as the Groupe Islamicque Armé (GIA) and later Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), there already existed favourable 
conditions for the development of radical Islamic movements in Algeria. Islam had been 
a source of identity long before the Afghan veterans returned; it was a key feature of the 
132-year-long war against colonial subjugation. The fight against France was not only 
carried out in the name of Algeria, but also in the name of Islam (Botha, 2008:23). This 
could clearly be seen in the already-existing group, Front islamique du Salut (FIS).  
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3.3.4 Group Islamicque Armé  
The GIA was probably the most brutal of the extremist groups in Algeria. It was 
established in 1993 and was heavily influenced by the Algerian Afghans. After the army 
seized power, the Algerian Afghans were not interested in elections and stated that the 
use of force was the only way to gain power and to set up an Islamic state (Cilliers, 
2003:96). While the other groups in Algeria saw victory as establishing an Islamic state 
of Algeria, GIA wanted to implement a Islamic state through the transformation of 
society by embracing fundamentalism (Gray & Stockham, 2008:92). The GIA was 
different from other extremist groups because of its focus on targeting civilians. They 
attacked government officials, journalists, intellectual’s, feminists, French-speaking 
people and other groups which they saw as contaminated by Western values. These 
were people who had abandoned Islam and therefore it was allowed to kill them 
(Steinberg & Werenfels, 2007:408). In September 1993 the GIA began to attack foreign 
correspondents and foreigners living in Algeria, and by 1997 over 115 had been killed 
(though the actual number might be much higher due to very inadequate the reporting) 
(Whittaker, 2007:159). The GIA´s bloody attacks on civilians led to a dwindling of 
support among the Algerians. Constant rumours that the organization was manipulated 
by Algerian intelligence agencies also brought the group into disrepute (Steinberg & 
Werenfels, 2007:408). The killing of Muslims was heavily criticized in the Muslim world. 
One of the consequences was that the former supporters in extremist circles in London 
decided to end their propaganda activities on behalf of the GIA. The combination of 
dwindling local support from Algerians and reduced international support from jihadist 
movements, led by Al-Qaeda, made the GIA to a large extent irrelevant; it  conducted its 
last international attack in 1996. As a result of this a number of smaller factions split off 
from GIA.  One of the GIA´s former regional commanders, Hassan Hattab, recognized 
the errors made by the GIA and, together with a number of Afghan veterans, created 
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) in 1998 (Gray & Stockham, 
2008:92). This was to become one of the strongest groups in Algeria. 
3.3.5 The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
GSPC was founded by a group of Algerians who were irritated that GIA´s brutal strategy 
had ruined the good name of both the Algerian militants and the cause they were 
fighting for. According to a former GSPC member, Mohamed Berraced, Osama bin 
Laden were pushing for Hattab to break away from GIA to form a group with  tactics and 
target selection that were less extreme. Al Qaeda stopped their support of GIA in 1996 
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(Botha, 2008:39). One of the main goals of the founding members was to restore 
international support for the Algerian insurgency, making it possible for them to work 
together with international Islamist networks (Hunt, 2007:5). Of the new groups 
established after the fall of the GIA, the GSPC was seen as the strongest; it managed to 
get some support from the Algerian population due to their focused attacks on security 
forces and state institutions. According to Steinberg & Werenfels (2007), the GSPC was 
as much a nationalist organization as an Islamist organization; even though the GSPC 
was cooperating with other international terrorist organizations, its main aim was to 
pursue a nationalist Algerian agenda. Shortly after being established, the GSPC took 
control of the GIA´s former support and logistical contacts in Europe; this explains how 
they were able to become so powerful so quickly (Steinberg & Werenfels, 2007:408). 
The GSPC in Algeria split into two main groups, one operating in the north, while the 
other one was operating in the Sahara desert in south of Algeria. The southern group, 
until 2007 led by Mokhtar Belmokthar, was able to take advantage of the great number 
of criminal opportunities in the area. According to Hunt (2007:6), he particularly focused 
on smuggling, from which he got one of his nicknames, Mr. Marlboro.  
 
By the late 1990s and early 2000, although the GSPC had become the most influential 
armed group in Algeria, they did not manage to destabilize the country, which was one 
of their main goals. They were able to get support from other militant Islamists, but their 
support among the Algerian population were dwindling because of a number of 
massacres of civilians in the mid-1990s (Steinberg & Werenfels, 2007). This made 
people believe that armed struggle against the government was not the best way to 
bring change to Algeria. The GSPC was forced onto the defensive by the Algerian 
security forces, which managed to confine GSPC activities to a region east and 
southeast of the Algerian capital, Algiers. The pressure on the GSPC increased 
substantially after 11 September 2001, when the US identified Algeria as a significant 
country for al-Qaeda activities. During the 2000s GSPC suffered from internal power 
struggles and from a limited ability to carry out attacks. As stated by Steinberg and 
Werenfels (2007:409), this helps to explain why they chose to enter into closer 
cooperation with Al-Qaeda.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
42	  	  
3.3.6 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
In 2005 and 2006 the main focus for the GSPC was to send fighters to the war in Iraq as 
part of its merger with al-Qaeda. The group had already sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda in 
2003, but the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan was hesitant to acknowledge GSPC as 
part of its framework in northern Africa. The al-Qaeda leadership had a number of 
concerns. First, the reconciliation movement in Algeria had been successful in getting 
great numbers of former GSPC fighters to surrender. From a peak of 4000 members in 
2002, the GSPC had dropped to under 500 members in 2006. Another concern was that 
they were questioning the GSPC’s commitment to a global agenda on account of their 
prioritization of domestic issues over international concerns (Gray & Stockham, 
2008:94).  The GSPC addressed these concerns by sending fighters to Iraq. They also 
expanded their activities into the Sahara-Sahel region, where the smuggling of 
contraband and human trafficking made it possible to send fighters to Iraq; at the same 
time this improved the organization’s international profile (Harmon, 2010:16). In 2003 
the GSPC swore allegiance to al-Qaeda and in 2004 they announced their international 
focus by declaring war against all Western foreigners on Algerian soil. In 2006 the group 
carried out one of its first attacks on foreigners when they attacked the international oil 
and gas joint venture company, Brown & Root Condor. One person died and 9 were 
injured when two busses carrying oil workers were attacked near Algiers (BBC, 2006). In 
January 2007 the GSPC became formally integrated into al-Qaeda and changed its 
name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Harmon, 2010:16).  After the merger 
with al-Qaeda, AQIM began a new offensive to please its new patrons. This included a 
roadside attack on a bus carrying Russian and Ukrainian workers on behalf of a Russian 
pipeline construction company some 130 km southwest of Algiers. Four workers were 
killed and several injured (Sedarat, 2007). This was done to show AQIM´s commitment 
and their resolve to hit foreign targets. 
 
After the terrorist attack on In Amenas in 2013 it was the former GSPC and AQIM 
commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who claimed responsibility. For almost a decade he 
had been having a troubled relationship with GSPC/AQIM and he had been building a 
name for himself outside AQIM (Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 2013). 
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3.3.7 Mokhtar Belmokhtar and the Lead-up to the In Amenas Attack 
Information about Mokhtar Belmokhtar has to be used with caution. Not much 
information is available about Belmokhtar or his newest terrorist group, the Masked 
Brigade. Much of the available information has been derived from anonymous 
intelligence sources and from interviews with Belmokhtar himself. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to get some sort of an account of his work over the last two decades, which has 
been strongly influenced by the transformation of terrorism in Algeria.  
 
After the In Amenas attack Mokhtar Belmokhtar again proved himself to be one of the 
leading jihadist personalities operating in the Sahara. He has been an important actor in 
the GIA, the GSPC and in AQIM: with two decades of involvement in jihadist activities 
he has become a important force in the Maghreb region (Black, 2009:8).  As regional 
leader of the GSPC in the south of Algeria he played a vital role in supplying the 
organization’s operations in the north with weapons. 2003 was a turning point for 
Belmokhtar when he failed to become leader of the GSPC. After this failure he distanced 
himself from the GSPC, focusing more on consolidating his control in southern Algeria 
and improving his relationship with local groups. In 2006, during GSPC´s merger with al-
Qaeda, Belmokhtar again asked to move up the ranks, but he was again denied. 
According to Callimachi (2013), his increasing frustration over not being valued caused 
him to drift even further south, where he established smuggling routes and recruited 
loyal fighters calling themselves the Masked Brigade.  
 
There is much uncertainty with regard to the establishment of the Masked Brigade. 
According to Black (2009) the group was founded in the early 2000s. Aronson (2014) 
and Callimachi (2013), on the other side argue that the group was founded sometime 
after 2007, while others again argue that the group was founded as late as at the end of 
2012 (Erlanger & Nossiter, 2013). Nonetheless, as argued by Black (2009:10), it is 
important to note that Belmokhtar and his brigade, despite their increasing detachment 
from AQIM, were for a long time important suppliers to the organization.  
 
In a letter dated October 2012 AQIM criticized Belmokhtar for his lack of action. They 
claimed that he had failed to carry out any spectacular attacks, despite the opportunities 
in the region. In the same month he left AQIM (Callimachi, 2013). It has not been 
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established whether he left voluntarily or if he was suspended (Erlanger & Nossiter, 
2013). After the break with AQIM, Belmokhtar and the Masked Brigade allied 
themselves with the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), another 
Islamic group, and set up base in the north-eastern city of Gao in Mali (Erlanger & 
Nossiter, 2013). Even though he had left AQIM, his group still answered to al-Qaeda´s 
senior leadership (Joscelyn & Roggio, 2013).  In a public statement in December 2012 
he announced that he was planning to attack Western interests (Roggio, 2013), and just 
weeks later he launched what was one of the deadliest attacks against an international 
oil and gas facility. 
3.4 Terrorism in the Oil and Gas industry 
Oil and gas facilities have always been a favoured target for terrorist groups. The 
attacks on pipelines, refineries, tankers, oilfields and facilities normally have two goals: 
to weaken the stability in the country they are operating in and to undermine the 
economies of foreign countries with interests in the country. During the last decade 
alone there have been numerous attacks against oil and gas targets, mainly in Africa, 
Latin America, the Middle East and Africa6. Luft and Korin (2003) argue that these 
attacks did not initially receive much attention, thus they were put into the broad 
category of industry risk. 
 
Security for the world’s oil and gas supply is to a large extent affected by political 
stability and, as seen in Tables 1 and 2 below, most of the oil and gas reserves are 
found in regions known for being politically unstable; this applies particularly to the 
Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa and South and Central America. Oil and gas 
production in these areas can be affected by political turmoil, armed conflict and 
terrorism. In previous times, when the gap between supply and demand was bigger, a 
disruption in production did not have the same effect as it was easier to find an 
alternative supplier. Today, because of the growing consumption of oil and gas, this gap 
has become much smaller. A minor disruption in production may have serious negative 
consequences for the world economy, and, as stated in Johnston (2008:1), terrorist 
groups all over the world have taken advantage of this and are today attacking oil and 
gas infrastructure to attain their goals. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Appendix B: Terror attacks against the oil and gas industry in Africa, Latin America and Middle 
East: 2001 – 2011	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Table 3.1: Distribution of gas reserves 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source: BP, 2013). 
 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of oil reserves 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Soruce: BP, 2013). 
 
3.4.1 The Threat from al-Qaeda 
In 1996 Osama Bin Laden made a public declaration of war against the West and he 
pointed out targets that were legitimate to attack.  These were targets that would not 
affect the economic and social structures in Islamic states. He specifically stated that oil 
and gas infrastructure in the Middle East was not to be attacked, due to its strategic 
importance as a revenue source which would be used to build the pan-Islamic super 
state that Bin Laden planned to create. In the declaration he only allowed for attacks 
against Western workers working in the oil and gas industry in the Middle East. The 
declaration did not prohibit attacks against transport infrastructure used to carry oil and 
gas to Western countries (Johnston, 2008:5). An example of such an attack was the 
bombing of the French oil tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen in 2002; it was 
carrying almost 400 000 barrels of crude oil. The bombing resulted in one dead, with 
twelve injured, and 90 000 barrels of crude oil leaked out into the Gulf of Aden (Sutton, 
2011). After the attack Al Qaeda issued a statement saying: “by hitting the oil tanker in 
Yemen, the mujihadeen hit the secret line, the provision line and the feeding to the 
Middle East  48,4% 
South and Central America 19,7% 
North America 13,2% 
Africa 7,8% 
Eastern Europe 7,4% 
Asia 2,5% 
Western Europe  0,7% 
Middle East 43% 
Eastern Europe 29,2% 
Asia 8,2% 
Africa 7,7% 
North America 5,8% 
South and Central America 4,1% 
Western Europe  1,8% 
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artery of the life of the crusader´s nation” (Lorenz, 2007:19). This declaration clearly 
reaffirms the legitimacy of attacks aimed at oil and gas transport facilities. It also clearly 
shows that al-Qaeda sees Western consumption of Middle East oil as pillage by the 
West. In Saudi Arabia several attacks were aimed at foreign workers. One of these was 
the attack on a petrochemical plant in Yanbu on May 1 2004, killing five foreigner 
workers and wounding three others (Macfarquhar, 2004). In the same month, on May 29 
2004, an oil industry compound in Khobar was attacked, leading to the deaths of 22 
foreign workers. According to reports from the BBC (2004), the terrorists were 
apparently trying to separate out the Western workers; they released five Lebanese 
workers just hours after the attack.  
 
3.4.2 9/11 and the New Focus on the Oil and Gas Industry 
However, the period where only Western workers were seen as legitimate targets was 
about to end. After the September 11 attack, assaults against petroleum facilities gained 
higher priority. Terrorist organizations started to identify oil and gas installations as 
targets that would have a major impact on the oil-dependent economies of the West. 
With the heightened security around transportation networks, government installations 
and military bases in Western and oil-producing countries, Al Qaeda issued a decree 
legitimizing attacks on all oil and gas facilities supplying the West (Johnston, 2008:6).  In 
March 2004 one of the leading figures in Al Qaeda at the time (now deceased), Abdul 
Aiz al-Moqrin, published a document entitled “The Targets inside Cities” on several 
Jihadist websites. In the document al-Moqrin gave instructions on targeting to the 
group’s members and to other affiliated groups. In the document al-Moqrin focuses on 
the oil sector: pipelines, wells, refineries and other Western investments in the oil and 
gas industry were included as acceptable targets. These types of attack would strike an 
economic blow at the enemies of al-Qaeda and their allies (Toft, Duero & Bieliauskas, 
2010:4417). This statement contradicts Bin Laden´s declaration of 1996 in the sense 
that it argues that these types of attacks did not undermine Muslim wealth since the oil 
at the time was not the property of the Muslim public community. However, as reported 
by Toft et al. (2010:4417), al-Moqrin states that members should not attack without 
permission from the top leaders in Al-Qaeda; they would decide on the type of targets to 
be attacked on a case-to-case basis. 
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3.4.3 The Importance of Oil and Gas  
Another document was also released in 2004, by the known jihadist Abu Bakir Naji and 
was named “The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the 
Umma Will Pass” (Naji, 2004). This document outlines a doctrine that sketches the 
strategies that jihadist movements should employ if they are to rebuild an Islamic state; 
these strategies should be applied to tackle organizational problems that may occur. He 
also argues for the importance of oil and gas installations as  targets for the Al-Qaeda 
network. The only way to defeat the Western states is by attacking the core of their 
economies, which are based on oil and gas (Naji, 2004:47). Or, as stated by a Jihadist 
website, “The killing of 10 American soldiers is nothing compared to the impact of the 
rise in oil prices on America and the disruption that it causes in the international 
economy” (Giroux & Hilpert, 2009). Naji´s argument for carrying out attacks on oil and 
gas installations is that it is an useful long-term strategy for weakening the financial and 
military capabilities of the West. In line with Al-Moqrin’s statement, he also points out 
that in spite of the negative economic consequences, these will only last for a short time 
following the attacks on oil and gas facilities; however, the attacks are justified because 
the wealth gained from oil is distributed unequally in favour of Western countries and 
cooperating Arabic governments. At the same time, Naji (2004) is clear on what types of 
oil and gas facilities not to be attacked. Oil wells are not to be attacked since these are 
needed to secure the wealth of the Muslim people after the Jihadists have taken control 
over ´their territories´ and defeated the West.  
 
3.4.4 Terrorist Should only Attack Targets where the Benefit Outweighs the Cost  
A third document, released in June 2004, clearly supports al-Qaeda´s stand on 
operations against oil and gas installations. The document was written by a cleric named 
Ab-al-Aziz bin Rashid al-Anzi and named “The Laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related 
Interests and a Review of the Laws Pertaining to Economic Jihad” (Toft, et al., 2010). As 
with the other two documents, it focuses on the oil and gas industry as an attractive 
target for terrorist organizations and argues that oil and gas installations that are not 
controlled by Muslims are legitimate targets. In the document al-Anzi emphasizes that 
an attack only should be conducted if the benefits of interrupting the flow of oil and gas 
do not outweigh the costs. When weighing the costs against the benefits he argues that 
the costs of attacking oil wells are too high. These types of attack can cause severe 
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environmental damage, and a loss of wealth that is impossible to recover from; they also 
result in negative publicity in the Arabic media, which in the long run can turn the 
general population against jihadist movements. When it comes to other targets of 
attacks, like oil tankers, pipelines and refineries, al-Anzi argues that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. These are targets that are easy to attack and at the same time have 
strategic value (Toft, et al., 2010:4418), while the environmental damage is seen as 
small and acceptable and the possible loss of wealth loss is seen as tolerable. 
 
As mentioned, after Bin Laden made his famous declaration of war against the West in 
1996, there has been an increase in attacks on oil and gas installations. These have 
risen from a little less than 200 in the period between 1980 and 1990 to almost 400 in 
the period between 2000 and 2011, according to the Energy Infrastructure Attack 
Database (EIAD) (cited in Giroux & Gilpin, 2013).  
 
3.4.5 How Terrorism is Affecting the Oil and Gas Industry Around the World 
One of the countries that have felt the impact of this upsurge in terrorist activity is Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to terrorist attacks due to the amount of oil and gas 
produced in the country, combined with the frequent occurrence of terrorist 
organizations in the region. Saudi Arabia has experienced a number of terrorist attacks 
and attempts, but it is not the only oil and gas producing country that is in danger of 
being exposed to terrorism. A number of countries outside the Middle East, primarily in 
the former Soviet Union, Africa and South Asia are also vulnerable to terrorist attacks 
(Luft & Korin, 2003). A common feature of many of these groups is that they are 
affiliated to al-Qaeda and often follow the recommendations given by the central 
leadership of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda´s focus on the oil and gas industry  affects targets 
around the globe as will be explained below.   
 
3.4.5.1 The Former Soviet States 
A number of the former Soviet states sitting on large oil reserves are facing a rise in the 
threat of terrorism from organizations operating from Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
Among these groups are Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islam, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
the Islamic party of Eastern Turkestan, together with groups of Uighur and Chechen 
separatists. Of these groups Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islam is seen as one of the more 
dangerous. It is located in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which 
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have large oil reserves. According to Luft and Korin (2003), this group is trying to seize 
power and introduce a Sharia-based Caliphate, which will focus on continuing the holy 
war against the West. 
 
3.4.5.2 South Asia 
South Asia, with its growing demand for oil, has come to be a new terrorist target. Al 
Qaeda´s main man in the region and leader of the terrorist group Jema´ah Islamiyah, 
Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, was arrested in 2003 after being accused of 
the nightclub bombing in Bali in 2002. He is also known for planning a number of attacks 
against oil depots in the Philippines and against the American oil company, Caltex Oil, in 
Singapore (Abuza, 2003:154). As can be seen in Luft and Korin (2003) terrorist groups 
in both these places have identified oil and gas installations as  highly vulnerable targets 
that can be attacked to strike a severe blow to the regimes which these groups are 
fighting.  
3.4.5.3 Africa 
Africa is home to a number of oil- and gas-producing countries that face a terrorist 
threat. Nigeria, which has the largest reserves of oil in Africa, has been called the “the 
next hotbed of Islamic radicalism” (Marshall, 2002), and at the current moment the 
terrorist organization, the Congregation of the People of Tradition of Proselytism and 
Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, is advancing in the country. In a video released 14 
February 2014 the group´s leader, Abubakar Shekau, warned that Boko Haram was 
planning to bomb oil refineries in the Niger Delta, Nigeria´s most important oil-producing 
region. Local groups in the Niger Delta are also causing problems for the oil industry. In 
2005, one of the main groups, Movement for the Emancipation of The Niger Delta 
(MEND), launched a large-scale offensive, targeting the Nigerian government and the 
international oil companies operating in the Niger Delta (Giroux & Hilpert, 2009). The 
bombing of oil facilities and kidnappings cut Nigeria´s oil exports by more than 28 per 
cent between 2006 and 2009. MEND stated in January 2014 that, “at the right time, we 
will reduce Nigerian oil production to zero by 2015 and drive off our land, all thieving oil 
companies” (Bala-Gbogbo, 2014). This shows that foreign oil companies face a serious 
security risk in Nigeria.  
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As seen here, oil and gas facilities and personnel all over the world are attractive targets 
for terrorism. The Norwegian oil and gas company Statoil is one of the companies that 
have experienced this: they lost five workers during the In Amenas attack. The next 
section will give a brief overview of Statoil and its international operations.  
 
3.5 The History of Statoil 
The In Amenas gas facility is a joint venture between Sonatrach, BP and Statoil. In this 
research study, Statoil´s political security-risk mitigation and management is analyzed.  
Some background information about the company is necessary. The Norwegian State 
Oil Company, also known as Statoil, was formed in 1972 as a company wholly owned by 
the Norwegian state; it was the state´s instrument for the development of the oil and gas 
industry on the Norwegian continental shelf. In 2001, Statoil was listed on the Oslo and 
New York stock exchanges and is today one of world´s largest sellers of crude oil and 
the second-largest supplier of gas to the European countries. As of 2013, Statoil is 
involved in operations in 33 countries and has more than 23 400 employees (Statoil, 
2014).  
 
At the end of the 1980s Statoil considered it highly likely that they would not find a new 
giant oilfield, as they did during the 1970s, on the Norwegian continental shelf. If Statoil 
was to continue as a profitable oil company, it had to expand internationally (Ryggvik, 
2014). In response to this, Statoil announced in 1990 that they had entered into strategic 
alliance with BP.  BP was a much bigger company and had the international experience 
that Statoil lacked. On the other hand BP saw an alliance with Statoil as a step towards 
improving their reputation, which in many countries was rather poor due to the fact that 
they had been used as a tool of the British Empire. The two companies would cooperate 
in exploration and production in different regions around the globe. Initially the focus was 
on Vietnam, Aserbaisjan, Nigeria and Angola where BP had a two-thirds share, while 
Statoil had one-third.  In 1998 BP bought the American oil company, Amoco, and pulled 
out of the alliance. In 2007 Statoil merged with Hydro´s oil and gas division to enable it 
to compete with large international companies such as ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco 
and Conoco-Phillips. The merger with Hydro did not produce an immediate 
breakthrough internationally, but in countries where both companies had been 
previously involved, such as Libya, Russia, Brazil and Angola, their position was 
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strengthened (Ryggvik, 2014). Throughout the late 2000s Statoil expanded its 
international activities and is today present in a number of the most important oil and 
gas regions in the world. Its most important investments are in Algeria, Libya, Angola, 
Nigeria, Russia, Azerbaijan, the US, the UK and Venezuela. In 2013 Statoil´s 
international activities amounted to 37 percent of Statoil´s equity production (Statoil, 
2014). In 2003 Statoil decided to enter Algeria; this become the company´s first onshore 
operation (Statoil, 2013a), and it suited Statoil´s international strategy. 
3.5.1 Statoil in Algeria 
Algeria has for a long period been one of the most important players in the international 
gas market and is currently the second-largest provider of gas to the European market 
(Ernst & Young, 2012). Statoil´s goal of becoming an international player in the gas 
market was in keeping with Algeria´s large gas reserves. Statoil first started to consider 
investments in Algeria in 2002.  
                       
At that time Statoil´s international investments were small: only four per cent of the 
workforce worked in the international division, which counted for only eight percent of 
Statoil’s total production. Statoil´s interests outside the Norwegian continental shelf at 
the time only involved a marginal field in China (Statoil, 2013a:34). In 2003 Statoil paid 
$840 million for a share in the two development projects in Algeria’s gas field’s, these 
were In Amenas and In Salah, which can be located on the map below. The first gas 
exports from In Salah started in 2004, while the In Amenas project started exporting in 
2006 (Statoil, 2013b). In Amenas is one of the biggest gas developments in Algeria. It is 
located 50 km from the Libyan border and almost 1,300 km from the Algerian capital of 
Algiers.   
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Map 3.2: Algeria´s main gas fields (Statoil, 2013a) 
 
Joining BP was seen as a major step for Statoil. Operating the facilities in Algeria would 
give Statoil valuable experience, which was ideal for its international growth ambitions.  
The In Amenas project consists of four gas fields, and the processing facilities in 
Tiguentourine. The contract area covers 2,750 sq. km., an area the size of Luxembourg. 
This is operated as a joint venture between Statoil, BP and the Algerian national oil 
company, Sonatrach (Ree, 2013). When investing in Algeria it is normal to enter into a 
joint venture with Sonatrach, which will hold at least 51 percent of the interest in all new 
projects (Ernst & Young, 2012). BP have been involved in the Algerian oil and gas 
business since the mid-1950s and signed the In Amenas project contract in 1998. The In 
Amenas report (Statoil, 2013a:35) reveals that in 2003 Statoil bought half of BP´s share 
in the In Amenas project. Through the joint operation the In Amenas project was equally 
shared, with a proportionate allocation of the most important management positions 
between Statoil and BP. 
 
When investing in Algeria, foreign companies are expected to invest in social 
development programmes and infrastructure. Statoil has, together with the United 
Nations Development Found (UNDP), supported an education project for Algerian 
women (Statoil, 2013b). Another project is a clean water production and purification 
facility that provides the households of In Amenas with water. Statoil has also invested 
in a 3.5-kilometer-long pipeline distributing water to the nearby town of Hassi Ghanem 
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(About the In Salah gas joint venture, 2010). Before investing in Algeria, Statoil was 
aware of the security risk involved in such a project (Statoil, 2013a:36), but by having a 
local partner in Sonatrach, a global partner in BP and the Algerian army stationed close 
by, Statoil felt that the security risk of investing in the In Amenas project was acceptable.  
3.6 The Attack on In Amenas 
The terrorist attack against the In Amenas facility in January 2013 lasted for four days 
and became one of the most serious attacks against an oil and gas facility in the 
industry´s history. The facility employed over 800 people, and of these more than 130 
were foreigners. When the Algerian army took control of the area on the fourth day, forty 
people from ten different nations had lost their lives (Unpacking Algeria´s hostage crisis, 
2013). What will follow is a brief overview of what happened during the terrorist siege of  
In Amenas. An overview map of the site as well as a map of the production are provided 
to give better visualization of the facility and the surrounding area, making it easier to 
understand what happened during the four days.  
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Map 3.3: In Amenas site overview (Statoil, 2013a). 
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3.6.1 Day 1 
On the morning of Wednesday 16 January 2013, at approximately 05.30, a bus carrying 
workers left the living area. Some of the workers were going to the city of In Amenas 
while others were going to the airport. Three vehicles from the gendarme escorted the 
bus together with a security liaison vehicle. Close to checkpoint one, indicated on map 
3.3 above, the convoy came under heavy fire from several attackers. At the same time a 
number of vehicles passed the bus heading for the living and production area. The 
gendarme returned fire and were able to radio the guards in the living area; the guards 
sounded the alarm, alerting the workers to the attack. A security guard and a security 
liaison were killed, while a Statoil employee was injured. According to Howden (2013), a 
soldier was able to break open one of the bus’s windows during the shootout, making it 
possible for the passengers, including the injured Statoil employee, to escape to 
checkpoint one, where they were rescued by the Algerian army. 
 
Next, heavily armed militants in several vehicles crashed through the gate of the living 
area where workers were on their way to breakfast and several of the workers were shot 
and injured. The militants immediately started to search for foreigners. The Algerian 
workers were told that they were not the targets and that they could take their 
belongings and leave. However, foreigners were found hiding among the Algerians 
when they were exiting, and this led to everyone being escorted back into the living 
area. The militants were especially looking for French, American and English nationals 
(Andreassen, 2013). Foreigners who were found were gathered up and many had 
explosives attached to their necks and waists. The terrorists also planted booby-traps 
and mines around the living area as a defence against an anticipated assault from the 
Algerian army (Howden, 2013). 
  
At the same time as the living area was attacked, another group of militants advanced to 
the production area where a number of workers, including four Statoil employees, were 
gathered. The workers were rounded up and put on a pickup which took them to the 
central control room, indicated as the main IBO office on map 3.4 below. According to 
Nossiter & Kulish (2013), the terrorists forced one of the hostages to restart the plant, 
which during the attack on the living area had been shut down as a result of a bullet 
hitting a high voltage transformer. It was not possible for the employee to restart the 
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plant by himself; when another hostage also failed to restart the plant, the terrorists gave 
up and moved all the hostages over to the gas processing trains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3.4: Overview of the production area (Statoil, 2013a). 
 
Through the entire first day of the siege there were extensive negotiations between the 
terrorists, the Algerian government and the joint venture. According to a video released 
by Belmokhtar on January 17, two days before the siege ended, the attack was a 
response to the Western intervention in Mali on January 11. A number of scholars have 
doubted this. French troops arrived in Mali just five days before the In Amenas attack. 
An attack this complex would have required months of planning. The French intervention 
was probably used as a justification for an attack that would have happened anyway 
(Jenkins, 2013). In the video Belmokhtar also demanded the release of Omar Abdel 
Rahman and Aafia Siddiqui, who had both been imprisoned in the US on charges of 
terrorism. Their final request was for an aeroplane (Roggio, 2013) to enable the 
terrorists and the hostages to be transported to Mali.  
 
3.6.2 Day 2 
In the morning of the second day a military helicopter fired into the living area, wounding 
the terrorist leader, Taher Bechneb. This prompted hundreds of the Algerian hostages to 
run for the gate in an attempt to escape, forcing the helicopter to withdraw. The terrorists 
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gathered the foreign workers as a human shield and began to move to the hostages to 
the production area (Nossiter & Kulish, 2013). In the afternoon the hostages were 
strapped with explosives and loaded into vehicles positioned next to the doors, ready to 
be used as human shields. When the vehicles left the gates of the living area they were 
fired upon by Algerian military helicopters and personnel on the ground. There are 
different accounts as to how many vehicles left the living area, but according to several 
sources six vehicles left the gate. On the way to the production area three of the cars 
exploded, two of the vehicles crashed, and one was hit by small arms fire from the army; 
it stopped outside the gendarme camp. Of the 26 hostages who were in the vehicles, 
only 10 survived. Two of the hostages walked to the production facility, but were killed 
by a terrorist who was still there (Howden, 2013). At the production area eight foreign 
workers from Norway, Romania and Britain decided to escape (Kulish, 2013); in the 
middle of the night they managed to get over the six–foot-high fence and head out into 
the desert, where after 15 hours with supplies running low they were picked up by the 
gendarme.  
 
3.6.3 Day 3 
On the third day, January 18, the army surrounded the production area and prepared to 
save the last hostages. There is little information on what happened at the facility on the 
third day because very few of the hostages survived (Chrisafis et al., 2013). In the 
afternoon an explosion occurred in the production facility. After the incident the 
wreckage of a car was found at the centre of the explosion outside gas processing train 
3, together with five dead hostages, three of whom were Statoil employees (Statoil, 
2013a:32).  
 
3.6.4 Day 4 
On Saturday morning, January 19, the army launched its final assault on the production 
area, killing 11 terrorists, and saving the remaining hostages; they declared the military 
operation over (Chrisafis et al., 2013). Of the 32 terrorists, 29 were killed (Ahmed, 2013), 
while the three remaining terrorists were arrested by the gendarme.  
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Here a detailed summery of the attack have been presented. In Chapter Four, the attack 
will be analyzed in more detail, looking at the political-security risk measures before and 
after the attack.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of chapter three has been to contextualize terrorism in the oil and gas 
industry and describe the development of terrorism in North Africa and Algeria.  
 
To enable an understanding of the conditions under which Statoil was operating in 
Algeria, this chapter analyzed the origins of terrorism in Algeria and in the larger 
Northern African region. The development of key terrorist groups in Algeria has also 
been examined  to provide an understanding of the events leading up to the In Amenas 
attack. This chapter has also provided an insight into Statoil´s history and the conduct of 
its international business. This helps to explain why Statoil chose to invest in Algeria and 
in the In Amenas gas field in  particular.  
 
In Chapter Four the features that have been examined in this chapter together with the 
theoretical foundation from Chapter Two will be used to analyze the impact terrorism 
has had on political-security risk in the oil and gas industry. The impact of the In Amenas 
attack on the oil and gas industry and the changes it may have brought about will also 
be examined.       
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Chapter Four: The Effect of Terrorism on Political-Security 
Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The oil and gas industry has always been a desired target for terrorists. During the past 
decade there have been numerous attacks against oil and gas facilities, primarily in the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America. However, other oil and gas regions in the world 
have also been victims of terrorism. The political-security risk branch of political risk has 
recently become of interest; because of this there is a lack of literature on the subject, 
especially regarding its relationship to terrorism. However, by looking at the practice of 
the oil companies, as reported in annual reports, in articles about terrorism in the oil and 
gas sector, as well as in surveys and in the recent In Amenas report from Statoil, it is 
possible to get a picture of how terrorism has affected political-security risk in the oil and 
gas industry.   
 
Up until the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US, terrorism by itself did not affect political-
security risk to a significant extent. The oil and gas industry focused more on risks 
related to dry holes, unstable states, foreign investments, new ventures and natural 
hazards. Terrorist attacks did not receive much attention and very often terror incidents 
were labelled “industry risks” (Luft & Korin, 2003). However, after the 9/11 attack 
terrorist organizations with a global reach, such as Al Qaeda, identified the world´s 
energy system as a major vulnerability and a sure way to damage the oil-dependent 
economies of the Western world. The attack added a sharp new focus to the industry´s 
approach to risk (Weinberg, Coplon & Williams, 2008). While the EIAD database 
recorded 359 attacks against oil and gas facilities in 2000, the number rose to 628 in 
2011 (Center for Security Studies, 2012); this led oil and gas companies to invest 
heavily in security measures. Large amounts of money have been spent on physical 
security measures around these facilities, but political-security risk management has not 
received the same attention. However, due to the severity of the In Amenas attack, 
which has been seen as a watershed moment for many companies, companies are now 
looking into their risk mitigation and management procedures.  
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Thus far this research study has provided a comprehensive overview of theory relevant 
to the study, as well as an outline of the terrorist threat facing oil and gas companies in 
Northern Africa. This chapter is the focal point of this research study: it aims to analyze 
the impact terrorism has had on political-security risk management and mitigation in the 
oil and gas industry. In this research study, the case study is the attack on the In 
Amenas gas facility, run by Statoil, BP and Sonatrach The first section will focus on the 
security situation at the In Amenas facility before the attack, on how Statoil managed the 
security at the facility and on how they managed security risk at a corporate level before 
the attack; this  is essential if one is to understand how the terrorist attack affected 
Statoil´s political-security management strategies. In section two the main research 
question will be the focus of the discussion, with support from the two sub-questions. In 
the final section some concluding remarks will be presented.  
 
4.2 The Security Situation at the In Amenas Facility Before the Attack 
In the previous chapter the In Amenas attack was given a thorough review; this  section 
will discuss the security situation at In Amenas before the attack. In order to better 
understand who was in charge of security risks in Statoil, a short overview of the 
organizational structure is in order. Figure 4.1 is used to make the organizational 
structure of Statoil easier to comprehend.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustrative overview of the reporting lines in Statoil (Statoil, 2013a:50). 
 
As can be seen on the figure above, Statoil is organized into seven business areas, 
which are individually responsible for the security in their operations. The In Amenas 
project is located in the business area named “Development and Production 
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International” (DPI). The leaders in each business area are members of the corporate 
executive committee and report to the chief executive officer (Statoil, 2014:13). Each 
business area is in charge of different regions. Algeria is part of the Middle East and 
North African region (MENA). The country office in Algiers is in charge of the In Amenas 
project, representing DPI (Tjelta, 2004). The corporate safety staff handled security 
issues, which were grouped together with the broader health, safety, and environmental 
matters in the company.  
 
4.2.1 The In Amenas Security System: Government and Corporate Responsibility.  
Prior to the attack the security at the facility was divided into four layers, which again 
could be divided into two groups, the outer and inner security systems. The outer 
system was the responsibility of the Algerian government, while the joint venture was 
responsible for inner security. The outer security was divided into three sections. The 
first was border protection, provided by the gendarme with, if needed, support from the 
army. The next protective layer was the military zone surrounding the facility. This zone 
was guarded by the Algerian army, which was based in the town of In Amenas. The 
communication between the army and the joint venture was maintained through 
meetings between the joint venture, the next–in-command of the military (located in In 
Amenas) and the governor of Illizi. According to the report (Statoil, 2013a), the 
gendarme provides protection for the site zone and is also responsible for the safe 
transportation of workers to and from the facility. This included the vehicle checkpoints 
outside the facilities. 
 
The inner security was provided by the joint venture. This includes protective barriers, 
identity control when entering, training of the workers, threat assessments and civilian 
guards. The security measures at In Amenas were based on the security situation 
prevailing in 2000. In 2009 Algeria experienced an increase in bombing and violent 
attacks in northern Algeria. For this reason the security measures were upgraded in 
2009 (Lebovich, 2011:8; Statoil, 2013a:48). The physical security measures that were 
put in place included double fences around the processing area and the living area, with 
concrete bars outside to stop incoming vehicles. At the entrance to the living and the 
processing area, chicanes and barriers were put up to slow down approaching vehicles 
(Statoil, 2013a:40). Algerian laws do not allow international oil and gas companies to 
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employ armed foreign security guards; they are however allowed to use armed Algerian 
guards. Nevertheless, the joint venture decided to use unarmed guards and to rely 
instead on the gendarme and the army for armed protection (Krauss & Kulish, 2013). 
The joint venture hired a liaison officer to supervise the day-to-day security, which 
included expatriate personnel deployed at the facility. The liaison officer was the link 
between the army and the joint venture and was in charge of coordinating and managing 
the security at the facility (Statoil, 2013a:46). The liaison officers were also responsible 
for providing an escort to and from the facility. 
 
4.2.2 The Security Risk-Management Process Before the Attack 
In addition to physical security measures at the site, a security risk management 
process had been put in place by the joint venture and it was the liaison officer’s 
responsibility to administer this. The risk-managing process included a set of risk 
assessments, and risk management and mitigation strategies aimed at lowering the risk 
level to an acceptable level (Statoil, 2013a:47). The In Amenas site was seen as having 
strategic importance for Algeria, and because of this Statoil was required to put forward 
a security plan that had to be approved by the local government in Illizi. As a 
supplement to this a security-management plan were developed, which was supposed 
to be updated twice a year. A civil-crisis plan along with a risk-assessment-and-action 
plan was also established.  The purpose of the security management plan was to review 
the security situation in the region and identify the most critical threats for the facility. 
This plan highlighted the importance of the army in the protection of the military zone, 
but the joint venture was not able to obtain detailed information about the army´s 
activities and deployments. Together with local criminals and kidnapping, the threat of 
terrorism was always part of the security management plan. However, the generic 
terrorist threat was not divided into more specific categories, which would have made it 
easier to prepare for different scenarios (Statoil, 2013:48). The purpose of the civil-crisis 
plan was to prepare the joint venture for the procedures it may have to carry out in the 
event of a terrorist attack; it also included procedures in the event of natural disasters 
and civil unrest. The plan included management guidelines to ensure that risks were 
managed in a suitable way.   
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The risk assessment and action plan was used to evaluate security risk measures 
before and after being implemented.  On the risk assessment and action plan, terrorism 
was one of the sections with highest risk score (Statoil, 2013a:48). With ongoing 
projects Statoil´s head office required a continuous risk evaluation of the security 
situation in the operation areas along with an analysis of appropriate security measures, 
but in the aftermath of the attack it have become evident that the capacity and 
competence required to perform such a task were limited.  
 
Statoil has a risk management unit, with the responsibility of handling Statoil´s risk 
management process. They have designed a standardized tool that is used at the 
different business levels in the company. The risk management unit is in charge of 
aggregating the risks from all the different business areas in the company; these then 
form a top-ten risk map that is presented to the board of directors and the executive 
committee four times a year. Very few risks are managed at the top level in Statoil (e.g. 
market and price risks). Security risk is among the risks handled on the business level 
(Statoil, 2013a:52). It is evident that Statoil has a number of risk management strategies. 
The next section will look at the extent to which these strategies were being used; it will 
also look at Statoil´s risk management in practice. The section will also examine how oil 
and gas companies use political-security risk in their analyses before and during 
operations to guide their investments in volatile environments.  
 
 
4.3 The Use of Political-Security Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry 
The purpose of this research study is to find out how terrorism affects political-security 
risk management and mitigation in the oil and gas industry. To address this research 
problem, it is essential to find out to what extent international oil companies have a 
political-security risk strategy in place to help in their management and mitigation plans, 
and how much focus there is on terrorism as a security risk in the planning of new and 
existing operations.  
4.3.1 Economic Risk vs. Political-Security Risk 
As argued in Chapter Two, political risk has become more important in the oil and gas 
industry; this is because the biggest reserves are to be found in unstable regions of the 
world. Thus, according to KPMG Partner Mantovano, oil and gas companies have 
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always been thorough when it comes to addressing risks that are function-specific, such 
as financial risk, exploration risk and production risk (KPMG, 2014:6). This can be seen 
in the annual reports of a number of the biggest oil companies in the world. In the 
ConocoPhillips annual report for 2013, most of the risks that are described revolve 
around financial risks, such as changing commodity prices, domestic and worldwide 
economic and political developments, together with price controls and production 
limitations (ConocoPhillips, 2014:27-28). The world’s sixth largest oil company (Helman, 
2013), Royal Dutch Shell, has much the same focus in its annual report: the emphasis is 
on risks associated with the global macroeconomic environment, with financial and 
commodity market conditions and with fluctuating prices (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014:11-
12).  Chevron, another leading international oil company, upholds the importance of 
managing the risk related to the fiscal terms of contracts and changes in tax laws and 
regulations in their annual report. The risks connected to the company´s ability to find 
and effectively produce oil and gas are also highlighted (Chevron, 2014:11). The same 
risk focus can also be seen in the annual reports for Statoil and BP prior to the In 
Amenas attack (Statoil, 2013c; BP, 2013). This is in line with a survey among senior 
executives in natural resource companies conducted by KPMG in 2014. In the KPMG 
survey (2014), the top risk scenarios in the industry were linked to economic risks. Sixty-
nine per cent of the respondents said that a global economic crisis was among the top 
three risks, while forty-six per cent argued that commodity price volatility was one of the 
top three risks. 
 
Security risk, on the other hand, did not get as much attention in the annual reports of 
the same oil and gas companies. ConocoPhillips and Chevron did not mention security 
risks regarding terrorism in their most recent annual reports (Chevron, 2014: 
ConocoPhilips, 2014). The same applies to BP’s annual report, published the year 
before the attack (BP, 2013). Of the companies mentioned above, Royal Dutch Shell 
has a section dedicated to security risks such as terrorism (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014:13), 
while Statoil in their annual report for 2012, mentions the risk of terrorism briefly in a 
section outlining risks regarding health, environment, safety and security (Statoil, 
2013c). The absence of terrorism as a security risk in the annual reports is reflected in 
the KPMG survey, where only eighteen per cent of those asked rated terrorism as one 
of the top three risks (KPMG, 2014:6).  Before the In Amenas attack security risk was 
not even rated among the top ten risks in Statoil’s corporate risk map (Statoil, 
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2013a:52). It is likely that terrorism, as a political-security risk, will be given more 
attention in future corporate risk maps.  
 
This new heightened attention can already be spotted in Statoil´s annual report for 2013. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, terrorism does not affect businesses to the same extent 
as many other types of risk, but when it first occurs it is regarded extremely seriously 
and it becomes an eye-opener for the businesses involved. It was therefore no surprise 
that in the 2013 report security risk has been separated from the health, safety and 
environmental (HSE) agenda and is given its own section (Statoil, 2014:93). A 
separation like this is something that will become more common in the future, according 
to an Ernst & Young report published in 2014. It has been the norm to place terrorism 
risk in the broader HSE risk category, but due to the fundamental difference between the 
traditional safety risk that has been part of the HSE category and terrorism, a different 
response is required from the industry. Ernst and Young (2014) continue by saying that 
due to the severity of the In Amenas attack, the terrorism risk has become so significant 
that it might become a risk category on its own in the future. 
4.3.2 Security Investments 
As stated in Chapter Two, the oil and gas industry is more likely to be affected by 
industry-specific risk on account of the sensitivity that surrounds a country´s oil reserves 
(compared to many other types of industry) (Moran, 1998). This includes economical 
and security risk; up to the present, political-security risks have not been given the same 
attention as economical risks in companies’ analyses. However this does not mean that 
they have not taken security issues, such as the threat of terrorism, seriously. Many 
resources have been put into what political-security risk describes as ‘human security’, 
the protection of the employees working in the oil and gas facilities around the world. 
Public access to oil and gas companies’ security measures and expenditure is usually 
very limited. Total, Chevron, ENI, Statoil, BP and Royal Dutch Shell are just some of the 
companies that do not give out details of their security measures; this makes it difficult to 
know to what extent these companies are managing political-security risk (Faucon, 
Williams, Said & Kent, 2013). Right after the In Amenas attack, many oil and gas 
companies in the region stated that they were increasing their security measures, but 
none of the companies was willing to say how much they had spent or to specify what 
kind of measures (Williams & Amiel, 2013). However some information does get leaked 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
66	  	  
to the public: a report from Royal Dutch Shell, published six months before the In 
Amenas incidence, is an example of this. The leaked report from Royal Dutch Shell 
gives an idea of the extensive investments oil companies make regarding human 
security. The document was leaked to the oil watchdog organization, Platform, in 2012 
and revealed that in the period 2007-2009 Royal Dutch Shell had spent nearly $1 billion 
on security measures at its facilities all over the world. Most of the spending was used 
for the protection of facilities and personnel in the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Over the three 
years, $383 million has been used to protect Royal Dutch Shell´s interests in the Niger 
Delta. If Royal Dutch Shell was a country, this would have put its security budget in third 
place in Africa (Hirsch & Vidal, 2012). Amunwa (2012) stated that the most surprising 
finding in the Platform report was the ineffectiveness of the company’s security spending 
in Nigeria, which suggests that the security situation has not improved.  
 
4.3.3 Regional Situational Awareness 
There is no doubt that huge amounts of money are used on security measures to protect 
production facilities and workers, but as stated by the Platform report, and as became 
evident after the In Amenas attack, oil and gas companies might benefit from expanding 
their view beyond the fences of the extraction area. Even though there are some 
companies, such as BP, that have a more complex system in place, the In Amenas 
attack shows how important it is that international oil and gas companies expand their 
situational awareness. It is of crucial importance that they broaden their risk analysis to 
enable them to detect and adapt to a changing transnational security environment 
(Thomas, 2013:4). One of the findings of the In Amenas report was that Statoil was not 
aware of changes in the regional security situation (Statoil, 2013a:69). Even though the 
In Amenas attack was an unprecedented incident, it should not be regarded as an 
inconceivable ‘once-off’. In the investigation report Statoil argue that no company would 
have been able to foresee such an attack, but on several occasions in 2012 the London-
based risk group, Exclusive Analysis, warned that oil and gas assets in southern Algeria, 
and foreign employees working at these facilities, could be targeted. Intelligence experts 
at the firm specifically mentioned the In Amenas gas facility and the risk to personnel 
(Jegarajah, 2013). An Exclusive Analysis report dated July 2, 2012 stated: “While the 
Algerian government is its primary target, the oil sector in south-west Algeria is a 
potential target” (Exclusive Analysis, cited in Jegarajah, 2013). Despite these clear 
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warnings the joint venture did not initiate additional security measures at the facility and, 
as noted by Trindal (2013), the threat level system in place was also not used as a 
security risk management tool during 2012. 
 
As can be seen from the numerous examples cited in the previous chapters, motivated 
and heavily armed terrorists have continued to show that they are capable of attacking 
well-guarded facilities. In the period before the In Amenas attack a number of regional 
events took place. One was the French intervention in Mali in support of the 
government´s struggle against Islamic extremists, who had direct links with AQIM, 
MUJAO and the Masked Brigade7. Another was Belmokhtar´s recent breakaway from 
AQIM and subsequent threats issued in December 2012. These incidents should have 
raised some questions about the security situation facing Western companies located in 
Southern Algeria (Gueye, 2014). According to Thomas (2013) international companies 
such as BP, which are present in a number of North African countries, place too much 
emphasis on the fact that they have a long-term presence and believe that this makes 
them less vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  
 
In 1998 Venter wrote an article about reasoned decision-making as a management tool. 
His case study was the tobacco industry, but a number of his arguments can easily be 
applied to today’s terrorist threat to the oil and gas industry. Political-security risk is 
difficult for the companies to control. He argues that a terrorist bombing cannot be 
subject to management control. Nevertheless, such incidents can and should be 
anticipated in the management operations of companies, and this is especially true in a 
large industries, such as the oil and gas industry, operating in volatile environments all 
over the world (Venter, 1998:6). Political-security risks are discontinuous; and can be 
viewed differently; they are not predictable on the basis of statistically based 
generalizations, for the incidents are too few and too disparate. However if the 
companies decide to do a fundamental descriptive analysis of the security situation 
regarding the transnational, national and human threats to security, this can provide the 
companies with early warning of impending political-security risks. As Venter says, “the 
issue at hand is not to be completely right, but to be more or less right” (Venter, 1998: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 	  On	   January	   11	   2013,	   French	   troops	   intervened	   in	   Mali	   after	   a	   request	   from	   the	  government	  of	  Mali	  to	  help	  retake	  the	  northern	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  which	  were	  controlled	  by	  several	  insurgent	  groups	  fighting	  for	  independence	  for	  Northern	  Mali	  (Errera,	  2013).	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7). As explained in Chapter Two, risk events are often so complex and are affected by 
so many interrelated causes that the outcome remains uncertain, even after a detailed 
political-security analysis has  been carried out.    
 
Political-security risk analysis with a focus on transnational, national and human security 
should be used on a regular basis. The security arrangements at In Amenas was 
established in a period when Algeria was more politically stable. The domestic threat 
level was generally understood at that time, but over time the security situation became 
more complex and the regional threat level more uncertain (Statoil, 2013a:71). As stated 
in Chapter Two, there has been an ongoing problem in that oil companies fail to see risk 
management as a continuing process. Often the companies conduct a risk analysis 
when doing a new investment, but fail to use risk management as an ongoing function 
(Lax, 1983). The In Amenas attack clearly shows how rapidly the risk landscape can 
change and how the priorities of oil and gas companies should change accordingly. 
After the attack companies in the whole North African region were quick to look at the 
lessons to be learned from the incident and at the  measures to be implemented to 
better protect the workers and facilities in the area (Ernst & Young, 2014:10). It is a 
common trend among oil and gas companies to implement new security measures after 
an attack has hit the industry, and this was also evident after the In Amenas attack 
(Faucon et al., 2013; Terrapinn, 2013). Even if Statoil had done an effective political-
security risk analysis before the attack it might not have prevented the attack from 
happening, but the attack may have been less successful. 
4.3.4 Political-Security Risk Management and the Lack of Integration. 
The joint venture was responsible for the security at In Amenas and could if necessary 
contact the owner companies if resources and expertise were needed. According to the 
findings in the investigation report this only took place to a limited extent. This might be 
one of the reasons why the threat level remained unchanged from February 2012 until 
the time of the attack. The joint venture identified a number of security issues, but it 
lacked the means to develop a systematic threat picture and to change their security 
posture (Statoil, 2013a:71). Improved communication between the joint venture and the 
companies involved might have improved the level of security vigilance for the In 
Amenas project. Combining the local insights provided by the joint venture with a more 
transnational perspective, provided by Statoil´s corporate risk management unit, would 
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have enabled a more thorough examination of the possible security risks to the In 
Amenas project; this would also have allowed for more options to be explored to 
mitigate the risk.  
 
As Statoil has expanded its international operations, it has also expanded its ability to 
manage security risks.  However the findings of the investigation team reveal that Statoil 
was not able to respond effectively to security risks in volatile areas such as Algeria. 
Statoil does have extensive documentation on their approach to security issues (The 
Statoil Book, 2013), but standard practices and methodologies were not followed 
consistently by the company. The process of security risk management in Statoil does, 
however, make an effective transformation from risk identification to action. One of the 
reasons for this is that security is not established as an independent function, but is a 
small part of the larger HSE position. This has led to a lack of full-time experts on 
security in Statoil. Statoil does employ security experts, but they are scattered 
throughout the company and are not effectively utilized. Because of this, much-needed 
cooperation across units and levels only happened on an irregular basis (Statoil, 2013a: 
73). These findings are no surprise if one takes a look at the KPMG survey, which 
revealed that in forty-nine per cent of the companies those responsible for risk 
management did not complete a thorough risk assessment every year. Eighteen per 
cent of companies said that they had no system to aggregate risks and thirty-six per 
cent of companies stated that they used their own business units to give a risk  
assessment (KPMG, 2014:6). The survey also revealed that a large number of 
companies acknowledged the importance of risk management, but at the same time 
only 65 per cent of the companies participating in the survey incorporated risk 
management often or always in their strategic planning decisions.  
 
The investigation, conducted after the attack, pointed out that Statoil lacked a clear 
holistic approach to risk management; according to a Statoil source political risk was 
seen as more of a PR issue. For years Statoil had employed a political risk firm in Oslo, 
but this firm was part of the communication department and not actively used (Bousso, 
2013). It was normal procedure in Statoil to outsource political and security risk before 
the In Amenas attack. According to Jakobsen it is not unusual among oil and gas 
companies, especially the smaller ones, for the risk evaluation to be conducted on an ad 
hoc basis, where an external risk agency provides the analysis. He argues that this may 
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lead to a lack of a more systematic strategy for risk management (Jakobsen, cited in 
Gitmark & Gravklev, 2013). However, the In Amenas incident was a watershed for 
Statoil and the company is now setting up its own political and security risk analysis 
team. Based in London, the team will include former intelligence personnel and analysts, 
and will focus on North Africa, East Africa, China and Central Asia (Bousso, 2013). This 
might indicate that Statoil will place more emphasis on political-security risk in the future, 
but, as stated in Chapter Two, oil companies often do not succeed in managing risks 
until they become apparent. They often react when the incident happens, but forget to 
prepare for incidents that might take place in the future. Statoil´s ability to manage future 
risks depends on its ability to  make good use of the new risk unit.  
 
A more holistic approach to securing oil and gas installations is thus needed, given the 
volatile areas in which oil and gas companies are investing. First, it is important that 
companies design strategies that fit the local context. To do this the companies must 
expand their capabilities with respect to political-security risk management. Better 
analysis of operating contexts is vital. The companies should adopt an evidence-based 
approach to be able to understand the power of contagion that generate clusters and to 
understand the motivations and attributes of brutal non-state actors. The terrorist groups 
operating today have a complex web of social, economic, political and ideological 
grievances. They also operate on a transnational level and often pursue different 
agendas. According to Giroux and Gilpin (2013), oil and gas companies must use multi-
pronged strategies to find ways to isolate extremists; by using a socio-anthropological 
lens they would be able to gain a deeper understanding of the various groups. 
Enhanced cross-border collaboration that can reduce the abilities of these groups to 
carry out attacks is also vital. An increased focus on the three levels of political-security 
risk will enhance the companies’ ability to manage future hazards, and reduce the 
terrorist risk to employees and facilities. A number of companies are bigger than Statoil 
and have been operating on a global scale for much longer. One of these is BP, which 
will be discussed in the next section.  
4.3.5 BP and the Use of Political-Security Risk  
There is a dearth of literature regarding political-security risk in the oil and gas industry. 
As explained in Chapter Two, this is largely because political-security risk is still a fairly 
new field of political risk. One has to look at alternative sources to get an idea of how the 
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oil and gas companies approach political-security risk management. Even though oil and 
gas companies don´t normally make their risk management procedures available to the 
public, it is still possible to gain some understanding of the different companies’ risk 
management approaches by other means. An example is BP, which along with many 
other companies keeps their risk models a secret. However it is possible to gain an 
insight into BP´s risk management approach from the perspective of its operational 
security; in this way one learns how BP evaluates and manages risks that they may 
encounter in potentially risky oil regions (Alon et al. 2006:633). Alon et al. (2006) argue 
that for BP, successfully managing security risk is one of the most important tasks 
associated with BP investments around the globe. To be able to handle the 
unpredictable security environment within which it operates, BP has embraced a 
converged risk approach to security. Instead of looking at the different risks individually, 
each group works closely together, harmonizing the process, and streamlining the 
communication and using the different groups’ collective experience to identify possible 
overlapping risk gaps (Price WaterHouse Coopers, 2010). Investments all over the world 
in a number of politically unstable states have created major security concerns for oil 
and gas companies such as BP. However, according to Alon et al. (2006), BP has been 
patient in dealing with such volatile situations, and as a step towards addressing security 
concerns, BP´s internal security system has played an important role in managing these 
situations. 
 
In 1997 Knott wrote an article on BP´s security strategy. Even though the article dates 
from 1997, it gives an indication of how BP handles security risk and it shows how BP´s 
security policy is tailored to fit the local requirements in a specific region or situation.  At 
the time the article was written, BP had a security organization that was headed by a 
number of regional security advisers, whose job was to provide security advice to BP 
operations in their region. Security management employs personnel with experience 
gained from the army, the police force and from foreign diplomatic offices. The BP 
security organization had a number of tasks; these included identifying threats and risks 
that could affect BP´s facilities, prioritizing responses to security threats, and making 
contingency security plans, along with a number of other security tasks (Knott, 1997). 
BP´s security plans involve close cooperation with governments in the host countries 
and with their armed forces. Close contact is secured through the close liaison with 
government agencies, including local armed forces. The main goal of the BP security 
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organization was clearly stated by the then regional security adviser in the Middle East, 
Tony Ling: “identifying and managing risk is what we are about” (Knott, 1997). The chief 
principles of BP´s pragmatic move towards security risk analysis include dialogue 
between different intelligence sources and the provision of tailored analysis, made 
specific to fit the different local conditions.  
 
The next section will look at to what extent the attack on In Amenas affected the industry 
and examine if any major changes have happened in the way companies use political-
security risk in their risk management strategies.   
 
4.4 Changes in the Oil and Gas Industry After the In Amenas Incident 
According to Giroux (2013) the increase in attacks against oil and gas installations 
requires a new discussion on the issue of security. She argues that a new security 
culture, new concepts, a new understanding and a more holistic approach to security 
risk in the oil and gas industry are needed. Effective strategies were not in place, but as 
a result of the In Amenas incident the industry did engage in discussion on the issue 
(Giroux, 2013). The unprecedented scale of the attack against In Amenas led to a boost 
in security spending by other companies in the area, such as Total SA and Royal Dutch 
Shell. The new threat represented by the attack on In Amenas caused what a senior 
industry executive operating in the whole North African region called a “sea change in 
the reality of risk” (Faucon et al. 2013). A clear illustration of the impact of the attack on 
the industry is that after the attack several major oil and gas companies and government 
officials from a number of countries met during the World Economic Forum in Davos 
where new security measures were discussed (Stoltenberg og Cameron sammen mot 
terror, 2013). The CEO of Shell, Peter Voser, stated that some initiatives were under 
way and that Shell was in the process of working on the mechanisms needed, but at the 
time of the interview this had not been completed (Faucon et al. 2013). That things were 
happening was also confirmed by Steven Colville (Zarroli, 2013), President of the 
International Association of Drilling Contractors, a forum for the oil and gas drilling 
industry; he stated that in his member companies there are people that constantly work 
on security issues, but this incident had forced them to review their security measures. 
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There is a difference between the big international oil and gas companies such as BP, 
which have been involved in volatile regions all over the world for a long time, and the 
smaller companies such as Statoil, which have only  recently started to invest outside 
Norway. Even though BP had a comprehensive internal security system in place, this 
was not sufficient to prevent the attack at In Amenas. The Statoil report published after 
the incident, together with the findings from Ernst & Young and KPMG, illuminates some 
of the tendencies that were present in the way oil and gas companies dealt with political-
security risk. Many have seen the In Amenas incident as a wake-up call for oil and gas 
companies, and there is general consent this would lead to an increase in spending on 
security measures (Jegarajah, 2013; Gjelten, 2013; Faucon, 2013). However, as stated 
by BP´s director of communication, David Bickerton (cited in Golob, 2013): “What 
remains to be seen is if the extractives industry will re-examine its risk assessments and 
risk management processes in the wake of the In Amenas incident and other similar 
crises.” 
 
 In Amenas has been an eye-opener for Statoil and other companies, not only those 
located in Northern Africa, but for all oil and gas companies operating in volatile 
environments all over the world. Due to the severity of the attack it is possible that 
companies will place more focus on the risk of terrorism. It is hard to say whether this 
will include a broader political-security risk approach or just provide another boost for 
measures to physically protect, but there are signs that point to an increased focus on 
political-security risk. At the time of writing Statoil is showing a willingness to invest more 
thoroughly in political-security risk through the creation of a new risk unit. Only time will 
tell whether this division will be actively used, or whether it will slide back into the same 
role as the old risk unit. However, at the moment, and with In Amenas fresh in mind, it is 
likely that Statoil will focus more on political-security risk than ever before.  
 
There is however little evidence in the annual reports of the major oil companies after 
the attack that indicates an increased focus on security with regard to terrorism. This is 
not to say that here is no focus on terrorism, but it might indicate that the In Amenas 
attack had a short-term effect on the industry, which began to fade when the incident 
became more distant. As mentioned earlier, the industry was more engaged in 
discussions about security after the attack, but according to Giroux (2013) there have 
only been some minor efforts to formulate new security strategies. In her work she has 
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seen few strategies that are new. There have been small changes in the way oil and gas 
companies operate and new ways of looking at safety and security, but there is still a 
long way to go. Except for the corporate changes in Statoil (with the forming of a new 
risk unit) and an improved focus on internal communication, there have been few major 
visible changes in the oil and gas industry when it comes to developing new security risk 
strategies. However the findings in the Ernst & Young (2014) survey, which showed an 
increased focus on terrorism as a risk factor; this might indicate that changes will occur, 
but this is a process that will develop over a longer period than is possible to examine in 
this research study.  
 
4.5 Factors Contributing to the Attack in In Amenas and the Unsuccessful 
Risk Mitigation 
There are a number of factors that contributed to the attack on In Amenas. The lawless 
situation on Libya and Mali made it possible to Belmokhtar to easily recruit and train a 
well-organized terrorist group; it was also easy  for the group to cross the Libyan border 
to carry out the attack. Belmokhtar needed to show AQIM that he was capable of 
executing substantial attacks; after being accused for lack of action in October 2012 
(Callimachi, 2013), he needed to demonstrate that his group was an important extremist 
group. The In Amenas facility was a perfect target for such a statement. According to 
Bøås (cited in The In Amenas attack – one year after, 2014) the attack on In Amenas 
was an outcome of the civil war that ended in the 90s, when errors were committed by 
both the Algerian government and the international community. Belmokhtar wanted to 
target the Algerian state by reminding the population of the civil war. As was explained 
in Chapter Three, In Amenas is a gas facility of great importance for the Algeria, 
providing the government with important revenues. The Western companies that 
operated the facility were seen as collaborators with the government and there were 
numerous western employees working on the site. These are factors that would 
automatically draw international attention and an attack would be in the headlines all 
over the Western world. A number of elements help to explain why attempts at risk 
mitigation before the In Amenas attack were not successful. For the purpose of this 
study seven main findings has been extracted from the report and compiled. 
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Table 4.1: Main finding in the In Amenas report. 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from, Statoil, 2013a). 
The table clearly shows that Statoil lacked focus on all the three levels of political-
security risk. On the human security level, the report revealed that the physical security 
measures in place were not sufficient to prevent the attack. The insufficient 
communication with the local community, as well as the poor recognition of the changing 
security situation on a regional and national level, also shows serious limitations on the 
national and transnational level of political-security risk management. The security 
system that was in place at In Amenas was established in a period of regional stability in 
the context of a well-understood domestic threat environment, but during 2011 and 2012 
the security situation in the region changed dramatically for the worse. The civil war in 
Libya turned a former relatively stable neighbour into a chaotic country where terrorists  
could easily move around (Goldstone, 2011:459). At the same time Mali was becoming 
a safe-haven for terrorist and extremist groups (Cafiero, 2014). Changes like these 
require a systematic political-security risk management process to bring the company up 
to date with possible security risks. As stated in Chapter Two, political-security risk need 
to be constantly observed, if not the company will end up with outdated information, 
making it difficult to manage possible risks.  In the case of In Amenas this did not 
happen. Even though the transnational security environment had changed dramatically, 
the In Amenas joint venture did not change its threat level: this remained unchanged 
from February 2012 until the attack, almost a year later (Statoil, 2013a:71). Discussions 
on security issues at the facility were hampered by a lack of communication internally in 
the joint venture regarding the security risks. According to the Statoil report there were 
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numerous examples of significant joint-venture security and crisis response plans that 
were not shared with key personnel at the facility. Even personnel responsible for the 
implementation of such measures were not included in these discussions (Statoil, 
2013a:72). The managers at the facility had limited information, which made it more 
difficult to decide on implementing new strategies. Closer cooperation between the joint 
venture and the owner companies on issues regarding security would have made it 
easier for the leaders at In Amenas to apply measures to deal with the new security 
environment.   
As explained in Chapter Two, by combining a transnational perspective with a better 
understanding of the national conditions, it is possible to broaden the discussion on 
security issues and at the same time increase situational awareness. In the case of In 
Amenas this would have made it possible to more rigorously consider a wider range of 
choices to mitigate the security risk. 
Statoil´s lack of effective political-security risk management is something that is evident 
throughout the company. Since Statoil’s first entry into Algeria in 2003, the company has 
expanded its international investments sevenfold (Jukov, 2012). Since then the 
company have increased its capacity to manage security risks, but the company´s 
overall capability and culture have to be improved in order to  respond to the security 
risks that are related to operations in unpredictable and complex environments. In the In 
Amenas report it was pointed out that Statoil lacked a culture which recognized that 
security was everyone’s responsibility (Statoil, 2013a:73). Extensive governing 
documentation on how to handle security risk is of little use if it is not followed up by the 
company.  
Now, one-and–a-half years after the attack, foreign workers are starting to return to In 
Amenas (Langved, 2014). New security measures have been implemented and it has 
been decided that the these security measures are sufficient. Below is a table of some 
of these new measures. This list has been compiled for the purposes of this research 
study in order to illustrate what political-security risk changes Statoil did after the attack. 
The list consist of the seven most important new security measures at the site and at 
corporate level.     
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
77	  	  
Table 4.2: New security measures  
 
(Source: Adapted from, Dagenborg & Chikhi, 2014; Bousso, 2013). 
As is evident from the table, Statoil have made a number of changes both at the In 
Amenas gas site as well as at a corporate level to improve the security situation. While 
the physical measures are limited to In Amenas, the introduction of a risk unit is a 
measure that will be helpful for Statoil´s other ongoing operations as well as for future 
investments in other unpredictable regions in the world. As seen in table 4.4, the new 
measures cover all three levels of political-security risk. The security measures on the 
human security level have been substantially upgraded as is apparent in points one 
through six, while national and transnational security is incorporated in point seven. The 
new and improved risk unit is one of the most important new measures since risk need 
continuous monitoring, an important factor Statoil often neglected in the past.  
   
4.6 The Management of Terrorism and Complications with Mitigation. 
Because of the importance of oil and gas in today’s world economy, it is difficult to 
completely mitigate the risk of terrorism in the oil and gas industry. This, combined with 
the sensitivity surrounding petroleum operations, caused by the view that the oil and gas 
resources are a country´s “national patrimony” (Alon et.al., 2006:631), presents a 
challenge to oil and gas companies all over the world. As revealed by the EIAD 
database, the number of attacks on energy infrastructure has been increasing since the 
early 1990s (Giroux & Gilpin, 2013). This includes attacks against onshore oil and gas 
installations, as well as against offshore targets such as tankers and oil platforms in key 
transit corridors like the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea (Giroux & Burgherr, 2012), 
Data from EIAD also indicates that terrorist attacks have a tendency to cluster in certain 
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regions and over time these form a wake-like pattern. According to Giroux and Gilpin: 
“the crests of these waves tend to correspond with flashpoints of instability characterized 
by localized “bursts” of violence aimed at energy infrastructure” (Giroux & Gilpin, 2013). 
Such clusters have occurred in the Middle East, South America, South Asia and 
Northern Africa (Giroux & Gilpin, 2013). Given this information, it is evident that political 
instability in the country of production and in the surrounding region causes an increase 
in attacks, and these can develop into clusters. The unstable situation in Algeria and the 
neighbouring countries, combined with the In Amenas attack, as well as smaller attacks 
against pipelines and personnel in Algeria, can indicate the possibility of a new cluster of 
attacks against the oil and gas industry in Northern Africa.  
 
Another factor making it difficult to mitigate terrorism is the world´s dependence on oil 
and gas. All over the globe income from oil and gas exports is an important revenue 
source for regime budgets. In Algeria oil and gas exports alone account for more than 
95 per cent of foreign currency earnings (Belalloufi, 2013). As stated in Chapter Three, 
by attacking vital oil and gas infrastructure terrorist groups are able to strike a direct 
blow against the regime and its international partners. With the world´s rising demand 
for oil and gas it is likely that the number of terrorist attacks will increase in the future. A 
$10 increase in real oil prices is associated with a decrease in the world economic 
growth rate of between 0,4 and 1 per cent (Mingqi, 2012) As stated by Johnston (2008), 
this gives terrorist groups an incentive to attack oil and gas installations as a way of 
damaging the economy of the Western powers, which has been one of the goals of Al 
Qaeda since the 1990s. 
 
At the time of writing, the US´s oil imports are declining, but this does not mean that the 
US will become less affected by terrorist attacks against oil and gas facilities. The US 
economy is closely linked to oil and is still to a large degree affected by what happens 
on the international market. Disruptions to supply from important Middle Eastern 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran still have a big impact on the American 
economy (Plumer, 2014). Europe´s oil dependence is also expected to grow and it is 
estimated that oil imports will rise by 78 per cent by 2035 and gas imports by 64 per cent 
(Klare, 2014). The world’s total demand for oil will, according to Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), continue to increase in the coming years 
(Zhdannikov & Johnson, 2014). These factors make the oil and gas industry a lucrative 
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target. At the same time there is growing investment in the oil and gas industry and in 
the future there will be more oil and gas installations, more pipelines and more entry 
points, making it easier for extremist groups to find accessible targets. According to 
Giroux (2013) and numbers from the EIAD database (Centre for Security Studies, 2012), 
it is likely that we will see more attacks in the future, not fewer attacks. The next section 
of this chapter will provide the oil and gas industry with some risk management 
recommendations regarding investment in volatile regions.  
 
4.7 Risk Management Recommendations for the Oil and Gas Industry. 
It has been pointed out that after the In Amenas attack Statoil lacked an overview of 
what was happening both at a national level and at a trans-national level. Based on the 
numbers that came up in the KPMG (2014) survey it is reasonable to believe that there 
also are other companies that have an inadequate overview of the situation in areas 
they operate in. For this reason this study will here briefly present some 
recommendations that will improve the ability of oil and gas companies to identify and 
manage future security threats. The first recommendation is to make use of a 
designated risk unit. This unit does not necessarily have to be a part of the company, 
but as stated previiously, this is preferable since it is not certain that external analysts 
will be able maintain a systematic strategy regarding risk management (Gitmark & 
Gravklev, 2013). It is important that companies develop their capacity to manage 
security risks, especially in an industry such as the oil and gas industry, which operates 
in complex and volatile regions. Understanding security risk is an important foundation 
for effective political-security risk management.  
 
A second recommendation is to make use of political-security risk analysis. By analyzing 
the three levels of security (transnational, national and human security) a company will 
be better equipped to handle future security issues. Attending to these three levels of 
security will provide a well-rounded and comprehensive analysis. In today’s globalized 
world it is no longer enough to have an idea of what is happening in the region close to 
the production site. Regional events have to be seen in relation to what is happening on 
a national and transnational level. The In Amenas terrorist attack is a perfect example of 
this. Nowadays the world is changing at an increasing rate, and this demands more of 
companies.  
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A third recommendation is that it is crucially important that information obtained by the 
risk unit is communicated throughout the whole corporate structure. It is vital that the 
company has a holistic approach to addressing security risks. Having good 
communication lines will make it easier for the company to be better informed on 
security issues; at the same time this will improve the situational awareness. This will 
allow for a more rigorous examination of a broader range of options to mitigate possible 
security risks.  
 
 A final recommendation is that there must be a continuous focus on risk at all times. In 
most cases it will not be possible a company to eliminate the security risk. It is therefore 
important that companies have a clear understanding of the remaining risks and of 
whether these are acceptable. Risk analysis is not something that should only be 
performed before deciding about a new investment. For effective risk management, 
continuous evaluation must be conducted before and during international operations, in 
order to be  prepared should  conditions change. This is especially important since oil 
and gas companies are now being forced to invest in increasingly volatile and uncertain 
regions where there are still available oil and gas reserves. Reports on risk levels have 
to be continuously reviewed, monitored and updated. 
4.8 Conclusion. 
The effect of terrorism on political-security risk can be questioned. As has been 
recognized in this chapter, the oil and gas industry has been affected by terrorism for 
many years without there being a substantial focus on a more holistic approach to the 
risk of terrorism. As for Statoil, political-security risk management has not been given as 
much attention as other risks, such as economic and production risks. The In Amenas 
attack however, might act as a wakeup call for oil and gas companies, especially those 
that have production facilities in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Changes are now 
underway and Statoil is creating a new political risk unit that will have a more central role 
in the company´s international operations than was the case before. As mentioned, 
there are signs in the industry that the companies are more eager to enter into 
discussion on political-security risk and its importance following the In Amenas attack. 
Because of the importance of oil and gas for the economies of the producing countries, 
as well as for the world economy it is not possible to totally mitigate the risk of terrorism. 
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However a comprehensive political-security risk analysis before and during production 
will increase the oil and gas companies’ ability to be aware of and prepare for incidents 
that may affect their personnel or facilities.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and Evaluation of the Research 
Study 
 
5.1 Introduction 
International oil and gas companies consistently put themselves at risk when investing in 
unstable areas. A continuous assessment of political-security risk in these countries is 
essential in facilitating successful investments and is of great importance for the safety 
of the employees of the companies. The very nature of their business is forcing the oil 
and gas companies to invest in regions which are high-risk environments. The ability of 
the companies to easily identify and analyze political-security risks in the countries they 
are operating in or considering investing in is thus crucial. In chapter one, the main 
research question was stated as: “What is the impact of terrorism on political-security 
risk management and mitigation in the oil and gas industry?” This question can now be 
answered accordingly. 
 
In the 1980s, Staphenhurst noticed a decline in the use of political risk assessment by 
companies (Staphenhurst, cited in Howell & Chaddick, 1994). Even though international 
companies today are more aware of political risk and use political risk assessments 
more effectively, some of the factors Staphenhurst cited are still present in the oil and 
gas industry. He argues that many companies failed to include the findings from political 
risk analysis in their corporate decision-making – because many executives viewed this 
as unnecessary. This can be seen in Statoil´s corporate attitude towards security risk 
management prior to the In Amenas incident. After one of the most severe attacks 
against the oil and gas industry there are now noticeable changes at Statoil, particularly 
with the creation of a new risk unit. The industry in general is re-evaluating its risk 
management strategies, and in particular the security risk situations in northern Africa 
and the Middle East are being examined. The oil and gas industry has always had a 
strong focus on security, but in an industry worth billions the companies are willing to 
accept high risk in return for high reward. It is thus crucial that there is effective political-
security risk management.  
 
This chapter concludes this research study with an overview of progress in relation to 
the research question as well as in relation to the aims and objectives of the study. The 
chapter also provides an evaluation of the research study and ends with a number of 
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recommendations for further studies in the field of political-security risk and its 
relationship with the oil and gas industry.  
5.2 Progress of the Research Study 
Chapter One introduced the research study. This was followed by a brief literature 
review, focussing on the areas relevant to this research. This included influential texts 
on the topics of political- and political-security risk and industry-specific risk in the oil and 
gas industry. Literature on terrorism in the oil and gas industry, as well as in Algeria, was 
examined. The review concluded by presenting texts that examined Statoil´s 
involvement in Algeria and that dealt with the In Amenas terrorist attack. The research 
question was presented along with two sub-questions, developed to support the main 
research question. The objectives and relevance of the study were discussed and the 
research design and methodology were outlined. This was followed by a section which 
delineated the research study. The first chapter ended with an outline of the research 
study.  
 
The purpose of Chapter Two was to present the theoretical grounding for this study as 
well as to contextualize the central concepts of the study. The theoretical grounding is 
based on rational-choice theory, as well as problem-solving and decision-making theory, 
giving the research a firm framework. A number of central concepts were clarified, 
including risk, political risk, political-security risk, macro- and micro-risk, industry- and 
firm-specific risk, risk management and mitigation as well as terrorism. By examining 
these concepts, this chapter was able to establish a solid foundation, on which this 
research study could build in Chapters Three and Four.  
 
Chapter three  contextualized the impact of terrorism on the global oil and gas industry. 
The period from 1996, when Al Qaeda declared war on the Western world, until present 
was the focal point. To be able to understand the conditions in which oil and gas 
companies are operating and what they have to deal with in their risk management 
processes, the evolution of terrorism in Northern Africa was outlined, with a particular 
focus on terrorism in Algeria and on the most influential terrorist groups. This followed 
the time period from the old GIA to today’s AQIM and the Masked Brigade. The aim of 
this chapter was to discuss the terrorist threat that international oil and gas companies 
face, with a focus on Northern Africa and Algeria in particular. Statoil´s international 
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operations and more importantly its presence in Algeria, was also scrutinized, and this 
provided valuable information for the forthcoming analysis.  
 
In Chapter Four the theory presented in Chapter Two was used to analyze the impact 
terrorism has had on political-security risk management in the oil and gas industry. The 
two sub-questions were used to supplement the research question and to enhance the 
quality of the analysis. In this chapter the case study was also scrutinized to obtain a 
better understanding of how an oil company manages  political-security risk before and 
after an attack.  
 
5.3 Main Findings of the Research 
The objective of this research study was to find out how or to what extent the risk 
management and mitigation strategies in the oil and gas industry are being affected by 
terrorism. If oil and gas companies do not conduct a thorough risk analysis when 
investing in new oil fields in volatile regions, they may place their facilities and personnel 
in unnecessary danger. The purpose of this study was not to conduct a risk analysis, but 
to increase knowledge about the use of political-security risk in the oil and gas industry, 
as well as examine to what extent terrorism has affected how oil and gas companies use 
political-security risk analysis as a management and mitigation tool before and during 
operations.  The main research question in this study is: “What is the impact of terrorism 
on political-security risk management and mitigation in the oil and gas industry?” To be 
able to answer that question, the theory presented in Chapter Two has been used to 
examine the sources presented in Chapter Four. The case study of the In Amenas 
terrorist attack has complemented the research question by providing a deeper 
understanding of how an oil and gas company utilizes political-security risk 
management.   
 
The findings in this research study revealed that the impact of terrorism on political-
security risk management in the oil and gas industry has been limited. There has been 
an increased focus on the human security level, but the same attention has not been 
given to the national and transnational level. However after the In Amenas incidence 
minor changes have been observed in the oil and gas industry. A more detailed 
explanation will here follow.  
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A company´s strategic planning is important for the profitability of the company and 
political risk management is an essential resource in this strategic planning process. 
Already in the 1980s it was normal for many international companies to see political risk 
assessment as less than essential when conducting business in foreign countries 
(Howell & Chaddick, 1994). The same tendencies can be seen today regarding security 
risk, as is evident in the KPMG (2014) survey. Even though there has been an obvious 
increase in terrorist attacks since 2000, the focus on a holistic political-security risk 
approach has not kept up with the threat to the industry. Terrorism has often been 
labelled as an industry risk, and as something one just has to accept in this type of 
industry (Luft & Korin, 2003). The increased focus on the oil and gas industry as a 
legitimate terrorist target started in the 1990s, and led to an increased emphasis on the 
human security aspect of political-security risk. The industry invested millions of dollars 
on physical security around their facilities. Fences, concrete barriers, video surveillance 
and guards were just some of the measures used to manage the terrorist threat. 
However, a more comprehensive focus on the national and transnational kinds of 
political-security risk seems to have been given less attention. The case study provides 
a good example of how these two elements were often downgraded. Up until the In 
Amenas attack terrorism had little effect on political-security risk management and 
mitigation in the industry, except on the human security level. However, because of the 
severity of the In Amenas assault there were some noticeable changes in the industry 
(Faucon et al. 2013; Stoltenberg og Cameron sammen mot terror, 2013). A terrorist 
attack of the kind seen at In Amenas might be what was needed for the industry to focus 
on a more holistic political-security risk approach to terrorism. As stated by Giroux 
(2013) little has happened in the industry so far, but there are some signs that changes 
are taking place. The oil and gas meeting during the World Economic Forum in Davos is 
an example of the industry trying to find ways to deal with the growing risk of terrorism 
(Stoltenberg og Cameron sammen mot terror, 2013). In an industry as big as the oil and 
gas industry, it takes time to change deeply rooted views and ideas, but an extreme 
accident such as the In Amenas attack might be just what is needed to make the 
industry see the value of a heightened focus on political-security risk. 
 
The first sub-question asked, “What factors contributed to the attack on In Amenas and 
why was risk mitigation not successful?”. A number of regional factors contributed to the 
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attack on In Amenas. The disruptive situation in the neighboring countries made it ideal 
to recruit and train for Belmokhtar and his terrorist group. The location of In Amenas, 
close to the Libyan boards also made it an ideal target. One of the reasons for the lack 
of success with mitigation was that it became evident after the attack that Statoil did not 
have a thorough political-security risk management strategy. The In Amenas report 
revealed a number of factors that played a role in this failure of risk mitigation, including 
poor situational awareness and the fact that security was not independent; it was part of 
the health and security unit. Possible security risks were also poorly communicated 
throughout the company. It was also stated that the physical security measures at the 
site where not sufficient, a possible consequence of the inadequate situational 
awareness. A serious incident had to take place before Statoil decided that risk 
management had to be reviewed.  
 
The second sub-questions was, “Is it possible for international oil and gas companies to 
mitigate the risk of terrorism, or can the risk only be managed?”  The findings revealed 
that it is almost impossible to mitigate the risk of terrorism completely. In a world where 
the economy is to a great extent oil-driven, the companies producing this commodity will 
continue to be prime targets for terrorists. With fewer and fewer new discoveries being 
made, companies are being forced to invest in the more insecure regions of the world. 
Many of the countries that produce oil and gas are highly dependent on revenues from 
the oil industry. This helps to explain why the oil and gas industry is a preferred target 
for terrorists who want to harm their governments. It becomes increasingly important 
that companies that decide to invest in volatile areas have a comprehensive political-
security risk management strategy in place. Again, the In Amenas attack can be used as 
an example. The In Amenas report clearly stated that Statoil had a poor situational 
awareness on a national and transnational level. There was also a lack of focus on 
security risk in the corporate structure. A clearer focus on continuous risk analysis could 
have improved Statoil´s regional understanding and would have meant they were better 
prepared for potential attacks. While it is not possible to completely mitigate the risk of 
terrorism, the companies accept the consequences and increase their atempts to 
manage the risk through the use of proper means. 
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5.4 Evaluation of the Research Study 
The oil and gas industry is forced to invest where the oil and gas fields are located. In 
many cases they are forced to invest in regions that might be regarded as high-risk. 
When such investment decisions are made, political-security risk can merge with the 
companies’ interests  and play an important role. Political-security risk analysis enables 
companies to be better able to predict issues that are associated with the investment; 
this is vital for the success of the investment. The purpose of this research study was to 
examine the effect of terrorism on political-security risk in the oil and gas industry. To 
supplement the research question, the terrorist attack against the In Amenas gas facility 
in Algeria, which was operated in a joint venture between Statoil, BP and Sonatrach, 
was chosen as a case study.  In Amenas was chosen because this was one of the most 
serious attacks the oil and gas industry had ever experienced. The attack also 
happened relatively recently, which made the study more relevant: it illustrated how an 
oil company at the present time was handling political-security risk. The In Amenas 
incident proved to be well suited as a case study because of the amount of available 
information with regard to the incident, and because of Statoil´s security risk 
management at the site and the company´s security risk management at the corporate 
level.  
 
The field of political risk is complex and wide-ranging, with numerous different sub-fields 
and definitions. The choice of a definition was resolved after a thorough examination of 
a number of political risk definitions; the result was an informed conceptualization of the 
term. The political-risk sub-field of political-security risk was chosen due to the very 
nature of terrorism, which has to be examined both at the national and transnational 
levels. A clear definition was arrived at, and together with the political risk definition, this 
provided a strong foundation for the rest of the research.  
 
One of the biggest challenges for this research was to gain access to primary data. 
International oil and gas companies do not give out detailed information about their risk 
management strategies because of security concerns. Access to models used by the 
political risk industry has also been limited due to the intellectual property rights of the 
risk companies. What is available are models that have been remodelled by researchers 
who have studied the behaviour of companies that use political risk models; their aim is  
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to gain a deeper understanding of the elements that these models consist of. 
Scrutinizing other available source such as companies’ webpages, scientific articles, 
newspaper articles, as well as surveys done among oil and gas companies has provided 
the primary data needed for this research study.  
 
 
 
 
5.5 Recommendations for Further Research 
Political risk is inter-disciplinary, and draws on fields such as economics, security 
studies, international relations, political science and development studies. These fields 
are constantly evolving and this affects the theory and methods of the study of political 
risk and its sub-branches, such as political-security risk. As a relatively new branch, the 
field of political-security risk is under-researched (in comparison with political risk) and 
the connection between political risk theory and security studies needs to be expanded 
on by further research. 
 
Another recommendation has to do with how research is being conducted on political-
security risk management in the oil and gas industry with regard to terrorism. To be able 
to identify how oil and gas companies are managing political-security risk, primary 
research is needed. Conducting field analysis to obtain better data on the strengths and 
limitations of the oil and gas companies’ political-security risk analysis would help our 
understanding of how these companies handle the risk of terrorism. Interviews with 
personnel in charge of risk units in oil and gas companies would be invaluable in 
providing deeper insights.  Primary research on terrorist groups would provide a greater 
understanding of their motivations and methods and would also inform the field of 
political-security risk management for international oil and gas companies operating in 
volatile environments. A more extensive use of primary data would assist in providing 
deeper knowledge, thereby enabling a better understanding of the use of political-
security risk by oil and gas companies operating in countries vulnrable to terrorism. 
 
The In Amenas incident was one of the most severe attacks against a gas facility in the 
history of the industry, and a number of oil and gas companies started to search for new 
answers to the security risks they were facing. It has only been one-and-a-half years 
since the terror attack and international gas companies are still adapting to the new 
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security challenges¸ but small changes can be seen. One example is Statoil´s new risk 
unit. Further research could incorporate a longitudinal study, analyzing if the changes 
that are now happening in the industry are just temporary or if this is evidence of a more 
permanent change in the way oil and gas companies make use of political-security risk 
in their operations.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Political-security risk is increasingly important for the oil and gas industry. International 
oil and gas companies consistently put themselves at risk when investing in unstable 
areas. A continuous assessment of political-security risks in these countries is 
necessary to ensure that  investments are successful. This is very important for the 
safety of the employees of these companies. The demand for oil and gas continues to 
increase; at the same  time fewer new discoveries are being made in what can be seen 
as safe regions. This means that oil and gas companies are forced to enter new high-
risk areas. This has led to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against oil and 
gas personnel and facilities. In an increasingly volatile world it is crucial that oil and gas 
companies undertake rigorous political-security risk analysis before as well as during 
operations. Failing to do so can lead, in a worst-case scenario, to a new tragedy such as 
that at In Amenas.  This research study has contributed to the wider debate regarding 
the oil and gas industry and its relation to the field of political-security risk; it has 
demonstrated the importance of a well-defined political-security risk strategy. The 
industry has so far failed to focus on a holistic approach to political-security risk, but the 
severity of the In Amenas attack has led the industry to look for new answers to security 
risks. Looking into the future, political-security risk are likely to become more, not less, 
relevant to the oil and gas industry. There is as yet no “end of history” in sight. The oil 
and gas industry will continue to be a target for terrorists, but by applying an effective 
political-security risk analysis strategy, the threat of terrorism can be better understood, 
explained and ultimately better managed. This would make it more possible for oil and 
gas companies to continue to invest and operate in high-risk areas. 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90	  	  
Bibliography 
 
About the In Salah gas joint venture. 2010. In Salah Gas. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.insalahco2.com/index.php/en/low-co2-gas-production/joint-
venture.html [2014, June 23]. 
 
Abullahi, A.M. 2007. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): The Dilemma of Its 
Struggle in Ethiopia. African Political Economy. 34(113): 556-562. 
 
Abuza, Z. 2003. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Crucible of Terror. Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc.  
 
Ahmed, A. 2013. At least 37 hostages killed in Algeria gas plant standoff, prime minister 
says. CNN. [Online]. 23 January. Available: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/21/world/africa/algeria-hostage-crisis/ [2014, June 
1].  
 
Alexander, Y. 2014. Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2013. Fifth Annual 
Report. United Sates of America: International Center for Terrorism Studies.   
 
Alkhereiji, M. 2005. Bin Laden moves toward economic terror. The Daily Star. [Online]. 
24 January. Available: 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2005/Jan-24/96171-bin-laden-
moves-toward-economic-terror.ashx#axzz34E8wQ9kk [2014, June 10]. 
 
Alon, I., Gurumoorthy, R., Mitchell, M.C. & Steen, T. 2006. Managing Micropolitical Risk: 
A Cross-Sector Examination. Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(5), 
p. 623–642.  
 
Alon I. & Martin, M.A. 1998. A Normative Model of Macro Political Risk Assessment. 
Multinational Business Review. 6(2): 10-19. 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
91	  	  
Alon, I., & Herbert, T.T. 2009. A stranger in a strange land: Micro political risk and 
multinational firm. Business Horizons. 52(2): 127-137. 
 
Amunwa, B. 2012 Dirty Work. Shell´s Security Spending in Nigeria and Beyond. London: 
Platform. [Online]. Available: http://platformlondon.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Dirty-work-Shell’s-security-spending-in-Nigeria-and-
beyond-Platform-August-2012.pdf [2014, June 27].  
 
Andreassen, T.A. 2013. Han er Algeries nye helt etter angrepet i In Amenas. 
Aftenposten. 27 January. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Han-er-Algeries-nye-helt-etter-angrepet-i-
In-Amenas-7103971.html#.U6FbAV7VtyQ [2014, June 1]. 
 
Aronosn. S.L. 2014. AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the Sahel. CTC Sentinel. 
7(4): 6-10. 
 
Badey, T.J. 1998. Defining international terrorism: A pragmatic approach. Terrorism and 
Political Violence. 10(1): 90-107. 
 
Bala-Gbogbo, E. 2014. Nigeria´s MEND Rebels Threaten Future Attack on Oil Industry. 
Bloomberg. [Online]. 27 January. Available: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-27/nigeria-s-mend-rebels-threaten-
future-attack-on-oil-industry.html [2014, May 26].  
 
BBC, 2004. Gunmen killed 22 in Saudi city. BBC News. [Online]. 30 May. Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3762423.stm [2014, April 25].  
 
BBC, 2006. Algeria bomb targets oil workers. BBC News. [Online]. 10 December. 
Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6167475.stm [2014, June 4].  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
92	  	  
Belalloufi, A. 2013. Algeria looks at ´reindustrialisation´ to reduce dependence on oil and 
gas. Business Day. [Online]. 14 October. Available: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/10/14/algeria-looks-at-
reindustrialisation-to-reduce-dependence-on-oil-and-gas [2014 August 13].  
 
Berlin, A., Berlin, A.I. & Vrooman LLP.  2003. Managing Political Risk in the Oil and Gas 
industries. Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, [e-journal] 1(2). 
Available:<http://d.yimg.com/kq/groups/3862917/1676412124/name/Managing%20
Political%20Risk%20in%20the%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Industries.pdf> [2014, 
April 2]. 
 
Bhatt, A. 2007. Global Terrorism. New Delhi: Lotus Press. 
 
 
Black, A. 2009. Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir. Terrorism 
Monitor. 7(12): 8-11. 
 
Botha, A. 2008. Terrorism in the Maghreb. The Transnationalisation of Domestic 
Terrorism. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.  
 
Bousso, R. 2013. After Algeria attack, Statoil sets up risk unit. Reuters. [Online]. 13 
September. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/statoil-risk-
idUSL5N0H91SH20130913 [2014, March 20]. 
 
BP, 2013. Annual Report, 2012.  London: British Petroleum.  
 
BP, 2013. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-
review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf [2014, May 16]. 
 
Bray, J. 2003. Attracting Reputable Companies to Risky Environments: Petroleum and 
Mining Companies, in Bannon, I. & Collier, P (eds.). Natural Resources and 
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Washington DC: World Bank. 287-352.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
93	  	  
Bremmer, I. & Keat, P. 2009. The Fat Tail, The Power of Political Knowledge For 
Strategic Investing. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Brewer, T.L. 1981. Political Risk Assessment for Foreign Direct Investment Decisions: 
Better Methods for Better Results.  Columbia Journal of World Business, 16(1): 5-
12. 
 
Brink, C.H. 2004. Measuring Political Risk. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 
 
Burnham, P., Lutz K.G., Grant, W. & Layton-Henry, Z. 2008. Research Methods in 
Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Butler, K.C. & Joaquin, D.C. 1998. Political Risk and the Return on Foreign Direct 
Investment. Journal of International Business Studies. 29(3): 599-607. 
 
Cafiero, G. 2014. Algeria's northern Mali headache: North Africa-issue in focus. Africa 
Conflict Monthly Monitor, 25-29. 
 
Callimachi, R. 2013. Rise of al-Qaeda Sahara terrorist. The Associated Press. [Online]. 
25 May. Available: http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2013/AP-
Exclusive-Rise-of-al-Qaida-Sahara-terrorist [2014, June 5].  
 
Center for Security Studies. 2012. Energy Infrastructure Attack Database. Zurich. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.css.ethz.ch/research/research_projects/index/EIAD [2014, June 10]. 
 
Chevron, 2014. 2013 Annual report. San Ramon: Chevron.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
94	  	  
Chiodo, A. & Owyang, M.T. 2002. A case study of a currency crisis: The Russian default 
of 1998. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 84 (November/December): 
7-18. 
 
Chrisafis, A., Borger, J., McCurry, J. & Macalister, T. 2013. Timeline of the In Amenas 
siege. The Guardian. [Online]. 25 January. Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/25/in-amenas-timeline-siege-algeria 
[2014, March 14]. 
 
Cilliers, J. 2003. Terrorism and Africa. African Security Review. 12(4): 91-103.  
 
Connors, W. 2008. New Attacks on Pipelines in Delta of Nigeria. The New York Times. 
[Online]. 17 September. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/world/africa/18nigeria.html?_r=0 [2014, April 
1]. 
 
ConocoPhillips. 2014. 2013 Annual Report. Houston: ConocoPhillips.  
 
Crenshaw, M. 2011. Explaining Terrorism. London: Routledge.  
 
CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies), 2010. Conference report. The 
Dynamics of North African Terrorism. Washington DC: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies.  
 
Dagenborg, J. & Chikhi, L. 2014. Algeria´s In Amenas gas plant returning to normal after 
attack. Reuters. [Online]. 1 September. Available:  
http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/normal-operations-amenas-gas-plant-
064705443.html  [2014, September 2]. 
 
Disraeli, B. 1900. Endymion. London: Longmans, Green 
 
Dupasquier, C. & Osakwe, P.N. 2006. Foreign direct investment in Africa: Performance, 
challenges, and responsibilities. Journal of Asian Economics. 17(2): 241-260. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
95	  	  
 
Erlanger, S. & Nossiter, A. 2013. Jihad ´Prince´, a Kidnapper, Is Tied to Raid. The New 
York Times. [Online]. 17 January. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/world/africa/mokhtar-belmokhtar-thought-to-
be-kidnappings-mastermind.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1& [2014, June 5]. 
 
Ernst & Young, 2012. Natural gas in Africa. The frontiers of the Golden Age. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Natural_gas_in_Africa_-
_The_frontiers_of_the_Golden_Age/$FILE/Natural%20Gas%20in%20Africa_28S
ep2012LR.pdf [2013, June 23].  
 
Ernst & Young. 2014. Business Pulse. Exploring dual perspectives on the top risks and 
opportunities in 2013 and beyond. Oil and gas report. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Business_pulse_-
_oil_and_gas/$FILE/E230-
1212_Risk_and_Opps_%20Business%20pulse_Oil_and_Gas_Final.pdf [2014, 
June 20].  
 
Errera, G. 2013. France had to intervene in Mali. Financial Times. [Online]. 16 January. 
Available: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/82be8d88-5f42-11e2-8250-
00144feab49a.html#axzz36sNNG1Fr (2014, July 8]. 
 
Faucon, B. 2013. Algeria´s El Merk Complex Start Oil Production After Security Boost. 
Rigzone. [Online]. May 7. Available: 
http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/126330/Algerias_El_Merk_Complex_Star
ts_Oil_Production_After_Security_Boost [2014, August 21].  
 
Faucon, B. Williams, S. Said, S. & Kent, S. 2013. Energy Firms Seek New Answer to 
Security Risks. Wall Street Journal. [Online]. 28 January. Available: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732382950457827018105
8676450  [2014, July 1]. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
96	  	  
FBI, 2012. Crime in the United States 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/16tabledatadecpdf [2014, April 15]. 
 
Fitzpatrick, M. 1983. The Definition and Assessment of Political Risk in International 
Business: A Review of the Literature. The Academy of Management. 8(2): 249-
254. 
 
Fouché, P.J. 2003. A Political-Security Risk Analysis of Uganda. Unpublished. 
 
Four oil workers killed in Algeria bus attack. 2007. Reuters. [Online]. 4 March. Available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/04/idUSL04254748 [2014, June 5].  
 
Frynas, J. G. 1998. Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria. Third 
World Quarterly. 19(3): 457-478. 
 
Frynas, J. G., & Mellahi, K. 2003. Political risks as firm‐specific (dis) advantages: 
Evidence on transnational oil firms in Nigeria. Thunderbird International Business 
Review, 45(5): 541-565. 
 
Giroux, J. & Hilpert, C. 2009. The Relationship Between Energy Infrastructure Attacks 
and Crude Oil Prices. Journal of Energy Security. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216:the-
relationship-between-energy-infrastructure-attacks-and-crude-oil-
prices&catid=100:issuecontent&Itemid=352 [2014, May 27].  
 
Giroux, J. & Burgherr, P. 2012. Canvassing the Target of Energy Infrastructure: The 
Energy Infrastructure Attack Database. Journal of Energy Security. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=379:canva
ssing-the-targeting-of-energy-infrastructure-the-energy-infrastructure-attack-
database&catid=128:issue-content&Itemid=402 [2014, August, 11].  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
97	  	  
Giroux, J. 2013. Terror Attacks on Energy Infrastructure – A Growing Threat? A 
roundtable discussion at the Department of War Studies. King´s College. 
Available: http://warstudies.podomatic.com/entry/2013-11-08T04_37_22-08_00 
[2014, August 10].  
 
Giroux, J. & Gilpin, R. 2013. Tackling Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability in Violence-
Prone Zones. Journal of Energy Security. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/02/27/giroux_gilpin/ [2014, May 27].  
 
Gitmark, H. & Gravklev, B.R. 2013. Statoil I mange risikosoner. Dagsavisen. [Online]. 18 
January. Available: http://www.dagsavisen.no/verden/statoil-i-mange-risikoson-er/ 
[2014, August 19].  
 
Gjelten, T. 2013. Algeria Attack A ´Wake-Up Call´ For Energy Companies. NPR. 
[Online]. 24 January. Available: 
http://www.npr.org/2013/01/24/170112260/algeria-attack-a-wake-up-call-for-
energy-companies [2014, August 21].  
 
Goldstone, J. A. 2011. Cross‐class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 
2011. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(4): 457-462. 
 
Golob, B. 2013. Cover story: Risk assessment in oil, gas and mining. Communicate. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.communicatemagazine.co.uk/currentissuemenu/4897-cover-story-risk-
assessment-in-oil-gas-and-mining [2014, August 21].  
 
Gray, D.H. & Stockham, E. 20  08. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the evolution from 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98	  	  
Algerian Islamism to transnational terror. African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations. 2(4): 91-97.  
 
Green R.T. & Smith, C.H. 1972. Multinational Profitability as a Function of Political 
Instability. Management International Review. 12(6):23-29 
 
Green, S. 2002. Rational Choice Theory: An Overview. Seminar on Rational Choice. 
Baylor University. [Online]. Available: 
http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc [2014, March 20]. 
 
Gueye, B. 2014. Belmokhtar group issues new threats. Magharebia. [Online]. 1 January. 
Available: http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/01/09/feature-
01 [2014, July 8].  
 
Gupta, D. K. 2008. Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence. The life cycle of 
birth, growth, transformation, and demise. New York: Routledge  
 
 
Haendel, D. 1979. Foreign Investements and the Management of Political Risk. Boulder: 
Westerview.  
 
Hansen, A. & Vriens, L. 2009. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Council on 
Foreign Relations. [Online] July 21. Available: http://www. cfr. org/north-africa/al-
qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717. [2014, May 30]. 
 
 
Harmon, S. 2010. From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian Islamist terrorist 
group into an Al-Qa‘ida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region. 
Concerned Africa Scholars, 85: 12-29. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
99	  	  
 
Held, V. 2004. Terrorism and War. The Journal of Ethics. 8(1): 59-75. 
 
Helman, C. 2013. The World´s Biggest Oil Companies, 2013. Forbes. [Online]. 17 
November. Available: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/11/17/the-worlds-biggest-oil-
companies-2013/ [2014, June 26]. 
 
Hirsch, A & Vidal, J. 2012. Shell spending millions of dollars on security in Nigeria, 
leaked data shows. The Guardian. [Online]. 19 August. Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/19/shell-spending-security-
nigeria-leak [2014, June 27]. 
 
History Bangladesh. 2014. Cairn Energy. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cairnenergy.com/index.asp?pageid=18&history=countries [2014, May 
2]. 
 
Hough, M. 2008. An Introductory Context of the Methodological, Conceptual, and 
Theoretical Framework of Risk Analysis, in K.G. Adar, R.O. Iroanya & F. Nwonwu 
(eds.). Towards Africa-Oriented Risk Analysis Models. A Contextual and 
Methodological Approach. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 1-17.  
 
Howden, D. 2013. Four days that shook the Sahara: The bloody battle for In Amenas. 
The Independent. [Online]. 20 January. Available: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/four-days-that-shook-the-sahara-
the-bloody-battle-for-in-amenas-8459243.html [2013. May 28].  
 
Howell, L.D. & Chaddick, B. 1994. Models of Political Risk for Foreign Investments and 
Trade. An Assessment of Three Approaches. The Columbia Journal of World 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
100	  	  
Business. 29(3): 70-91. 
 
Hunt, E. 2007. Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa. A ´Thorn in the Neck´ of the 
United States? Policy Focus 65. 
 
Jakobsen, J. 2012. Political Risk and the Multinational Company. Concepts, Theories 
and Evidence. Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag. 
 
Jegarajah, S. 2013 Experts Had Warned of Attack on In Amenas Gas Plant. CNBC. 
[Online]. 27 January. Available: http://www.cnbc.com/id/100410586 [2014, July 
8]. 
 
Jenkins, B.M. 2013. The Motivation Behind the In Amenas Terrorist Attack. RAND 
Corporation. [Online]. 29 January. Available: 
http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the-motivations-behind-the-amenas-terrorist-
attack.html [2014, June 9]. 
 
Johnston, P. 2008. Oil and Terrorism. Al Qaeda´s Threat. [Quebec]: Defence R&D – 
Canada. Centre for Operational Research and Analysis. [Online]. 20 April. 
Available: www.academia.edu/471280/Oil_and_Terrorism_Al_Qaedas_Threat 
[2014, April 8].  
 
Joscelyn, T. & Roggio, B. 2013. Al Qaeda-linked groups claims credit for kidnappings in 
Algeria. The Long War Journal.  [Online]. 16 January.  Available: 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/al_qaeda_commander_c.php?ut
m_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWar
JournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29 [2014, 
January 16]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101	  	  
 
Jukov, I. 2012. Norwegian Statoil: Vision and Victory. The OMG. [Online]. 24 August. 
Available: http://theogm.com/2012/08/24/norwegian-statoil-vision-and-victory/ 
[2014, August 14]. 
 
Kaldor, M. 2012. New and old wars. Organized Violence in a global era. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Kaplan, S & Garrick, 1981. The Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk Analysis. 1(1): 11-
27. 
 
Klare, M.T. 2014. Europe´s resource dilemma: Escaping the dependency trap. Europe´s 
World. [Online]. 21 March. Available: 
http://europesworld.org/2014/03/21/europes-resource-dilemma-escaping-the-
dependency-trap/#.U7_h517VtyQ [2014, July 12].  
 
Knott, D. 1997. BP Molds Security Strategy to Fit The Country. Oil & Gas Journal. 
[Online]. 6 September. Available: http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-
95/issue-23/in-this-issue/general-interest/bp-molds-security-strategy-to-fit-the-
country.html [2014, July 1].  
   
 
Kobrin, S.J. 1979. Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration. Journal of International 
Business Studies. 10(1): 67-80. 
 
Kobrin, S.J. 1980. Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs. International 
Organization. 34(1): 65-88. 
 
Kobrin, S.J. 1981. Political Assessment by International Firms: Model or Methodologies? 
Journal of Policy Modeling. 3(2):251-270. 
 
Kobrin, S.J. 1982. Managing political risk assessment. Berkeley, CA: University of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102	  	  
California Press. 
 
Kobrin, S.J. 1984. Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LCDs: trends 
from 1960 to 1979. International Studies Quarterly. 28(3): 329-348. 
 
KPMG, 2014. No paper chase: Transformation risk management at energy and natural 
resources companies. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/documents
/no-paper-chase.pdf [2014, June 11].  
 
Krauss, C. & Kulish, N. 2013. Algeria Gas Compound Lacked Armed Guards. The New 
York Times. [Online]. 23 January. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/world/africa/algerian-gas-facility-did-not-
have-armed-guards.html?_r=0 (2014, June 19).  
 
Kulish, N. 2013. Gas Complex Worker Tells of Terror and a Desperate Escape. The 
New York Times. [Online]. 22 January. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/world/africa/worker-at-algerian-gas-facility-
describes-escape.html?pagewanted=1&mabReward=relbias:w&module=Search 
[2014, June 1].  
 
Lambrechts, D. Weldon, C. & Boshoff, M.J. 2010. Political Insecurity and the Extraction 
Industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Moving towards an Industry 
Specific Political-security Risk Analysis Mode, in Swart, G. (ed.). A Vanquished 
Peace? Prospects for the Successful Reconstruction of the Congo. London: 
Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd.  
 
Langved, Å. 2014. Statoil tilbake på In Amenas. Dagens Næringsliv. [Online].  23 July. 
Available: http://www.dn.no/nyheter/utenriks/2014/07/23/2157/Energi/statoil-
tilbake-pa-in-amenas [2014, July 29].  
 
Lax, H.L. 1983. Political Risk in the International Oil and Gas Industry. Green´s Farms: 
Atlantis, Inc. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
103	  	  
 
Lebovich, A. 2011. AQIM Returns In Force in Northern Algeria. CTC Sentinel. 4(9): 8-12. 
 
Leone, J. 2010. Post-Sovereign Security and the Absence of the Political. Journal of 
Peace, Conflict and Development. 16: 87-109. 
 
Lia, B & Kjøk, Å. 2004. Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of Petrolium 
Terrorism, 1968-99, in Heradstveit, D & Hveem, H. (eds.). Oil in the Gulf: 
Obstacles to Democracy and Development. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Lorenz, A. J. 2007. Al Qaeda´s Maritime Treat. Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center. [Online]. 
September 19. Available: http://terrorism-
information.com/data/pdf/PDF_19294_2.pdf [2014, March 20].  
 
Luft, G. & Korin, A. 2003. Terror´s next target. The Journal of international Security 
Affairs. 6: 95-101.  
 
Macfarquhar, N. 2004. Five Foreigners Killed in Attack At Saudi Office. The New York 
Times. May 2. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/world/five-
foreigners-killed-in-attack-at-saudi-office.html [2014, May 17].  
 
March, J.G. & Shapira, Z. 1987. Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk taking. 
Management Science. 33(11): 1404-1418. 
 
Marret, J.L. 2008. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A “Glocal” Organization. Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism. 31: 541-552. 
 
Marshall, P. 2002. The Next Hotbed Of Islamic Radicalism. The Washington Post. 
[Online]. 8 October. Available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/next-hotbed-
islamic-radicalism#.U4MydV7VtyQ [2014, May 26] 
 
 
Martinez, L. 2000. The Algerian Civil War. 1990-1998. London: C. Hurst & Co. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104	  	  
 
Martinez, L. 2006. Why the violence in Algeria? The Journal of North African Studies. 
9(2): 14-27. 
 
Mathur, K.M. 1996. Crime, Human Rights and National Security. New Delhi: Gyan 
Publishing House.  
 
Mclvor, T. 2013. Baron Oil affected by terrorist attacks in Colombia. London South East. 
[Online]. 27 January. Available: 
http://www.lse.co.uk/AllNews.asp?code=3ebsy8sr&headline=Baron_Oil_Operatio
ns_Affected_By_Terrorist_Attacks_In_Colombia  [2014, April 8]. 
 
Miller, K.D. 1992. A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International 
Business. Journal of International Business Studies. 23(2):311-331.  
 
Mingqi, L. 2012. The Global Economy is Now More Vulnerable to Oil Prices than Ever. 
Oilprices.com. [Online]. 14 March. Available: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/The-
Global-Economy-is-Now-More-Vulnerable-to-Oil-Prices-than-Ever.html [2014, July 12].  
 
Minor, M.S. 1994. The Demise of Expropriation as an instrument of LDC Policy, 1980-
1992.  Journal of International Business Studies, 25(1)177-188. 
 
Molinski, D. 2013. Rebels in Colombia hit energy sector hard in ´Black October´. The 
Wall Street Journal. [Online]. 2 November. Available: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230407320457917355054
9400052 [2014, April 26].  
 
 
Moran, T.H. 1998. Lessons in the management of international political risk from the 
natural resource and private infrastructure sectors, in Moran, T.H. (ed.). 
Managing international political risk. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
105	  	  
Naji, A. B. 2004. The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which 
the Umma Will Pass. [English Translation] Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Harvard University  
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013. 
Annex of Statistical Information: Country Reports on Terrorism 2012. Maryland: 
University of Maryland. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210288.pdf [2014, April 28]. 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 2013. 
Global Terrorism Database. [Online]. Available: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
[2014, June 20].  
 
Neuman, W.L. 2011. Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitative 
Aapproaches. Boston: Pearson Education 
 
Nossiter, A. & Kulish, N. 2013. Militants’ Goal in Algeria Gas Plant Siege: Giant Fireball. 
The New York Times. [Online]. 2 February. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/world/africa/hostage-accounts-detail-events-
at-saharan-gas-
plant.html?pagewanted=1&mabReward=relbias:w&_r=0&module=Search  [2014, 
June 2]. 
Oxy Drops Petroecuador Suit, Focuses on Government Case. 2006. Rigzone. [Online] 5 
October. Available: 
http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/36834/Oxy_Drops_Petroecuador_Suit_F
ocuses_on_Government_Case [2014, April 29].  
 
Pham, J. P. 2008. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: An Evolving Challenge in the War 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
106	  	  
on Terror. World Defense Review. 8. 
 
Pippard, T. 2010. ‘Oil-Qaeda’: Jihadist Threats to the Energy Sector. Perspectives on 
Terrorism, 4(3): 3-14. 
 
Plumer, B. 2014. How the oil boom could change U.S. foreign policy. The Washington 
Post. [Online]. 16 January. Available: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/16/how-the-u-s-oil-
boom-is-changing-the-world-in-6-charts/ [2014, July 11].  
 
Poynter, T.A. 1982. Government Intervention in Less Developed Countries: The 
Experience of Multinational Companies. Journal of International Business 
Studies. 13(1): 9-25. 
 
Price WaterHouse Coopers. 2010. Convergence of security risks: Addressing the 
security dilemma in today´s age of blended threats. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.asis.org.uk/documents/Security%20Risk%20Convergence_FINAL%20
v2.pdf [2014, August 14]. 
 
Pringle, C. & Lambrechts, D. The Risk of Humanitarianism: Towards an Inclusive Model. 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 33(2):51-80. 
 
Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar. 2013. BBC. [Online]. 4 June. Available: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21061480 [2014, June 5]. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107	  	  
Ree, M. 2013 Statoil I Algeria. Slik fungerer Statoils In Amenas anlegg. Teknisk 
Ukeblad. [Online]. 17 January. Available: 
http://www.tu.no/petroleum/2013/01/17/slik-fungerer-statoils-in-amenas-anlegg 
[2014, May 22].  
 
Reinhart, C. & Rogoff, K, 2002. FDI to Africa: The role of price stability and currency 
instability. International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 03/10. 
 
Robock, S.H. 1971. Political Risk: Identification and Assessment. Columbia Journal of 
World Business. 4: 6-20. 
 
Robock, S.H. & Simmonds, K. 1989. International business and multinational 
enterprises (4th ed.). Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
 
Roggio, B. 2013. Belmokhtar claims Algeria raid, slaying of hostages for al Qaeda. The 
Long War Journal. [Online]. 20 January. Available: 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/belmokhtar_claims_al.php# 
[2014, June 9].  
 
Royal Dutch Shell. 2014. Annual Report 2013. London: Royal Dutch Shell. 
 
Ruby, C.L. 2002. The Definition of Terrorism. Analysis of Social Issues and Public 
Policy. 2(1): 9-14. 
 
Russell, C.A., Banker, L.J. & Miller, B.H. 1979. Out-Inventing the Terrorist, in Alexander, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108	  	  
Y., Carlton, D. & Wilkinson, P. (eds.). Terrorism: Theory and Practice. Boulder: 
Westview Press, Inc.  
 
Ryggvik, H. 2014. Statoil Asa. Store Norske Leksikon. [Online]  Available: 
http://snl.no/Statoil_ASA [2014, May 21] 
 
SC/11004. 2013. Security Council 6965th meeting. [Online]. 13 May. Available: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11004.doc.htm [2014, May 28].  
 
 
Schmid, A.P. & Jongman, A.J. 1988. Political Terrorism. Amsterdam: North Holland 
Publishing Company. 
 
Security Service, MI5. Undated. [Online]. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-
threats/terrorism.html [2014, March 4]. 
 
Shahin, E.E. 1997. Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Sedarat, F. 2007. Al Qaeda claim bomb in Algeria. Reuters. [Online]. Available: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/09/21/uk-algeria-bomb-
idUKL2114649420070921 [2014, May, 20].  
 
Senussi, M. & Ziemba, R. 2010. Maghreb: 2011 Outlook. Roubini Global Economics. 
[Online] 7 December. Available: http://www.roubini.com/analysis/140746.php 
|2014, June 9]. 
 
Shahin, E. E. 1997. Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
109	  	  
 
Simon, H.A. 1955. Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 69(1): 99-118. 
 
Simon, H.A. 1979. Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations. The American 
Economic Review. 69(4): 493-513. 
 
Simon, H.A. 1982. Political Risk Assessment: Past Trends and Future Prospects. 
Columbia Journal of World Business. 17(3):62-70.  
 
Simon, H.A., Dantzig, G.B., Hogarth, R., Plott, C.R., Raiffa, H., Schelling, T.C. Shepsle, 
K.A., Thaler, R., Tversky, A., & Winter, S. 1987. Decision-making and problem-
solving. Interfaces, 17(5):11-31. 
 
Statoil, 2013a. The In Amenas Attack. Report of the investigation into the terrorist attack 
on In Amenas. Prepared for Statoil ASA´s board of directors. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/Pages/12Sep_InAmenas_r
eport.aspx [2014, February 3]. 
 
 
Statoil. 2013b. Aktiviteter. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.statoil.com/no/About/Worldwide/Algeria/Activities/Pages/default.aspx 
[2014, April 29].  
 
Statoil, 2013c. Annual Report 2012. Stavanger: Statoil.  
 
Statoil, 2014. Annual Report 2013. Stavanger: Statoil.  
 
Steinberg, G. & Werenfels, I. 2007. Between the ´Near`and the ´Far`. Enemy: Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb. Mediterranean Politics. 12(3): 407-413. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110	  	  
 
Steinhäusler, F., Furthner, P., Heidegger, W., Rydell, S. & Zaitseva, L. 2008. Security 
Risk to the Oil and Gas Industry: Terrorist Capabilities. Strategic Insight. (8)1:1-
44. 
 
Stoltenberg og Cameron sammen mot terror, 2013. Dagbladet. [Online]. 25 January 
Available: 
http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/01/25/nyheter/politikk/utenriks/storbritannia/norge/
25434845/ [2014, September 13].  
 
Stora, B. 2004. Algeria 1830-2000. A Short History. Translated by J.M. Todd. London: 
Cornell University Press.  
 
Sutton, J. 2012. USS Cole bomb suspect finally gets his day in court. Reuters. [Online]. 
8 November. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/08/us-usa-
guantanamo-usscole-idUSTRE7A73O120111108 |2014, April 24].  
 
Tadjbakhsh, S. 2005. Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to 
Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan. [Online]. Available: 
www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude117_118.pdf [2014, 
April 10]. 
 
Taheri, A. 2008. Al-Qaeda´s sinister creep into North Africa. The Times. [Online]. 30 
July. Available: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article44
25820.ece. [2014, May 30].   
 
Terrapinn, C. 2013. How the Algerian Terrorist Attack is Affecting the Oil and Gas 
Industry. The Oil & Gas Post. [Online]. 1 March. Available: 
http://www.oilgaspost.com/2013/03/01/algerian-terrorist-attack-affecting-oil-gas-
industry/ [2014, August 12].  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
111	  	  
The In Amenas attack – one year after. 2014.  Norwegian Institute of International 
Affaires.  [Online]. Available: http://english.nupi.no/Activities/News/The-In-
Amenas-attack-One-year-after [2014, August 18].  
 
The Statoil Book. 2013.  Statoil. 5 July. [Online] Available: 
http://www.statoil.com/en/about/thestatoilbook/downloads/theststaoilbook.pdf 
[2014, July 4].  
 
Thomas, J. 2013. The In Amenas Gas facility Attack: A New Mindset Required for 
Corporate Sector. Future Directions International. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/associate-papers/1434-the-in-
amenas-gas-facility-attack-a-new-mindset-required-for-corporate-sector.html 
[2014, June 20].  
 
Thornton, T.P. 1964. Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in Eckstein, H. (ed.). 
Internal War. New York: The free press of Glencoe. 
 
Tjelta, S.A. 2004 Statoil åpner kontor i Algerie. Offshore.no. [Online]. 27 September. 
Available: http://www.offshore.no/sak/8779_statoil_aapner_kontor_i_algerie 
[2014, July 4).  
 
Toft, P., Duero, A. & Bieliauskas, A. 2010. Terrorist targeting and energy security. 
Energy Policy. 38: 4411-4421. 
 
Trindal, J. 2013. Gas Refinery Attack in Algeria: The Lessons Learned. Domestic 
Preparedness. [Online]. 20 March. Available: 
http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Infrastructure/Building_Protection/Gas_R
efinery_Attack_in_Algeria:_The_Lessons_Learned/ [2014, July 10].  
 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. 1986. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. The 
Journal of Business, 59(4): 251-278. 
 
Unpacking Algeria´s hostage crisis. 2013. Al Jazeera. [Online]. 21 January. Available: 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
112	  	  
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/01/20131201324107553
99.html [2014, June 1].  
 
U.S Department of State, 2012. Title 22, Section 2656f(a). United States Code. 
 
Uzodike, U.O. & Isike, C. 2009. Whose security? Understanding the Niger Delta crisis as 
a clash of two security conceptions. African Security Review. 18(3): 103-116. 
 
Venter, A. 1998. An assessment of micro-political risks: reasoned decision making as a 
management tool. Politeia. 17(2): 3-28.  
 
Weinberg, D.M., Coplon, G.H. & Williams, J. 2008. Oil Industry has a new risk factor: 
terrorism. Oil and Gas Journal. [Online]. 3 March. Available: 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-106/issue-9/general-interest/oil-industry-
has-new-risk-factor-terrorism.html [2014, August 14].  
 
Wells, L.T. 1998. God and Fair Competition: Does the Foreign Direct Investor Face Still 
Other Risks in Emerging Markets? In T.H. Moran (ed.). Managing International 
Political Risk. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 15-43. 
 
Whittaker, D.J. (ed.). 2007. The Terrorism Reader. New York: Routledge.  
 
Williams, S & Amiel, G. 2013. Foreign Firms in Algeria Boost Security. The Wall Steet 
Journal. [Online]. 17 January. Available: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732446810457824785069419083
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
113	  	  
8 [2014, July 1].  
 
Yetiv, S. 2011. The Petroleum Triangle: Oil, Globalization, and Terror. New York: 
Cornell University Press.  
 
Zarroli, J. 2013.  Algeria Attack Raises Security Alarms for Energy Firms. NPR. [Online]. 
22 January. Available: http://www.npr.org/2013/01/22/170000601/algeria-attack-
raises-security-alarms-for-energy-firms  
 
Zhdannikov, D. & Johnson, C. 2014. U.S. Oil Boom Seen Further Eroding OPEC Market 
Share. Daily Finance. [Online]. 11 July. Available: 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/07/11/us-oil-boom-erode-opec-share/ [2014, 
July 11].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
114	  	  
Appendix A 
 
Attacks against the oil and gas industry in the Maghreb region: 2001-2011 
 
Date Country City Perpetrator 
2001-11-30 Algeria Krakrib GSPC 
2002-01-19 Algeria Krakrib GSPC 
2002-05-17 Algeria  Krakrib GSPC 
2004-06-21 Algeria Algiers GSPC 
2005-03-09 Algeria Ammal Unknown 
2005-09-15 Algeria Trig El Qares GSPC 
2006-02-23 Algeria Zemmouri GSPC 
2006-08-13 Algeria Krakrib Unknown 
2007-02-20 Algeria Oued Slama AQIM 
2007-04-11 Algeria Ain Sebih Algerian Islamic 
Extremists 
2007-04-11 Algeria  Skikda Unknown 
2007-05-15 Algeria Jijel AQIM 
2007-06-22 Algeria Draa El-Mizan AQIM 
2007-07-20 Algeria Souk El Had AQIM 
2007-09-12 Algeria Si Mustapha AQIM 
2007-11-04 Algeria Skikda Unknown 
2007-12-08 Algeria Algiers Unknown 
2008-03-03 Algeria Laadjadra AQIM 
2008-07-17 Algeria Aomar AQIM 
2009-02-22 Algeria Ziama Mansouria AQIM 
2009-04-19 Algeria Bir El Ater Unknown 
2009-06-08 Algeria Jijel Unknown 
2009-11-23 Algeria Thenia AQIM 
2010-07-31 Algeria El Oglat Krakra AQIM 
2010-08-01 Algeria Bir El Ater AQIM 
2011-07-19 Tunisia Zaghouan Unknown 
2011-09-12 Libya Ras Lanuf Unknown 
2011-11-17 Algeria Djabahia AQIM 
2011-12-06 Algeria Aomar AQIM 
 
(Source: Adapted from, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, 2013; Center for Security Studies, 2012) 
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Appendix B 
Terror attacks against the oil and gas industry in Africa, Latin America and Middle East: 
2001 – 20118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, 2013).  
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  This is a summary of terror attacks against the oil and gas industry with the most impact with 
reference to fatalities and casualties.	  	  
Date Country Fatalities Casualties 
2001-10-21 Colombia 4 11 
2002-05-07 Colombia 2 4 
2002-10-06 Yemen 1 12 
2002-12-22 Colombia 2 11 
2003-08-10 Colombia 0 20 
2003-12-01 Turkey 5 4 
2004-06-21 Algeria 0 11 
2005-10-15 Turkey 0 5 
2006-02-24 Saudi Arabia 4 4 
2006-05-22 Colombia 5 9 
2006-10-04 Colombia 1 4 
2007-04-20 Nigeria 0 6 
2007-10-31 Nigeria 1 4 
2007-11-08 Yemen 12 6 
2006-11-30 Nigeria 3 6 
2008-03-04 Algeria 1 7 
2008-04-14 Ethiopia 3 18 
2008-09-15 Nigeria 1 4 
2009-06-30 Colombia 1 4 
2010-04-27 Algeria 0 6 
2010-07-11 Colombia 10 4 
2011-04-10 Colombia 0 4 
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